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GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER EUROPE: DENMARK

Description

An analysis of the political, economic, social, and military controls which the Nazis established for the government and exploitation of Denmark.

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This study is Part Three, Section Four, II, of the series

GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER EUROPE

the outline of which is as follows:

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Part Two. German Controls in Occupied Europe

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II. DENMARK

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Occupation

The speed of the German occupation on 9 April 1940 was stunning. In violation of the non-aggression pact signed on 31 May 1939, German troops crossed the border and took possession of the country in the early morning hours, cruisers entered the harbor of Middelfart on the west coast of Fyn, and troops landed on the east coast of Fyn and at the Korsor. Most Danes woke to find the German forces rapidly taking possession of their country, swarming over the Schleswig border or crowding ashore at Copehagen and on the islands. The German Minister, von Renthe-Fink, presented a memorandum to the Danish Foreign Minister stating that the important military objectives had been occupied to forestall violation of Denmark's neutrality by the Allies, requesting the cooperation of the Danish Government, and giving the solemn promise that neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of Denmark would be impaired.

The German bombers flying low over Copenhagen dropped not bombs but thousands of light green pamphlets containing an address to the Danish people from the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, General Leonard von Kaupisch. It stated that Germany's aim was to keep England from making Scandinavia a battlefield, and it assured the Danes that "it is not the German Government's intention to create for itself a base for the struggle against England.1/ The Commander called on all Danes to continue their daily tasks and their observance of law and order. He declared that agreements were being made between the German Reich and the Royal Government of Denmark

1/ Gudme, Sten, Denmark: Hitler's "Model Protectorate" (London, 1942), pp. 18-19.

which would "secure the continued existence of the Kingdom, the maintenance of the Army and Navy, respect for the freedom of the Danish people and the full security of the future independence of this country." Although no such agreements were ever concluded, both the German and Danish governments were inclined to consider the understandings of 9 April as an agreement.1/

2. The Attitude of the Danes

After receiving the memorandum King Christian met with the Government, which agreed that, since a large part of the military objectives had been seized, resistance would result only in needless bloodshed and destruction. It therefore presented a protest to the German authorities, and the King ordered all resistance to cease. On the same day the King issued a statement, countersigned by Prime Minister Stauning which announced:

> Under protest the Danish Government has resolved to regulate the conduct of the country in relation to the occupation which has taken place, and accordingly makes the following proclamation:
>
> The German troops now in the country are acting in connection with the Danish defense forces, and it is the duty of the population to refrain from any opposition to these troops. The Danish Government will try to safeguard the Danish people and our country against the calamities attending upon war conditions and therefore appeals to the population for a quiet and restrained attitude in relation to the situation which has now arisen. Quiet and order must characterize the country and a loyal behavior be shown to all persons in authority. 2/

The King also issued a personal appeal over his own signature stating to his people:

> In the present situation, so grave for our fatherland, I appeal to everybody in town and country to show an absolutely correct and dignified behavior, since any ill-advised actions or utterances may have the gravest consequences. God save you all. God save Denmark. 3/

1/ CF. negotiations over the Anti-Comintern Pact (D3) and Lovtidende for Kongeriget Danmark for Aaret 1941, A, 9 June, p. 792. This source will hereafter be cited as Lovtidende.
2/ Lovtidende, A, 9 April 1940 p. 319
3/ Ibid., A, 9 April 1940, p. 318.

The Danes settled down to accept the occupation. In the absence of any formal agreement they recognized no obligation on their part beyond the refraining from opposition. As the Danes saw it, in return for their laying down of arms the Germans had promised not to intervene in Danish affairs. Whenever possible as citizens they ignored the presence of the Germans, and Danish officials maintained intact, so far as they could, the administrative and legal machinery of the country. Later, after the German encroachments of August-September 1943, many Danes considered that the Germans had invalidated the implicit agreement of 9 April and that consequently they were free to engage in active or passive resistence.

3. The General Status of the Occupation

The Germans designed for Denmark a status very different from that of the other Western countries which were over-run in the spring of 1939. Whereas they brought the Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern France under direct German control -- whether that of the Wehrmacht or that of a Civil Commissioner, they allowed Denmark to retain the full framework of its government and a theoretical, even if not actual, freedom of its exercise of sovereignty. The Wehrmacht did not exercise supreme authority in Denmark but only the rights of an occupying army, limited by military necessity. No Reichskommissar or other German civil authority was sent into Denmark. Danish central administration -- King, Cabinet Ministers, and Rigsdag -- was allowed to carry on; all local officials stayed at their posts. Germany continued to deal with Danish authorities on a formal diplomatic level, through the Danish Foreign Minister, who dealt in turn with the Danish executive, legislative, or administrative agencies. From the legal point of view, this formal respect for Danish sovereignty and autonomy meant that

Denmark was not an area of military government in the technical sense; the case was one of military occupation without military government. The Germans saw it as an instance of what Werner Best called "alliance administration," or the achievement of convergence in the basic policies of two friendly states through an explicit or implicit agreement and the subsequent intimate collaboration of the respective diplomatic organs. From a realistic standpoint, in view of the actual domination of Denmark by Germany, the case was not one of alliance-administration but rather of satellite administration. In return for its protection of the satellite Germany demanded and was granted what its interests required in Denmark's foreign relations and economic life.

Germany's choice of the satellite status for Denmark reflected her desire to play up Denmark as a "model protectorate" for the edification of the other European states whose collaboration she wished in the New Order, with or without the presence of German troops. On the other hand, so far as concerned policy towards Denmark alone, this preferential status indicated Germany's conception of Denmark's favorable rank in the racial hierarchy of Nordic peoples, a recognition of the reward deserved by Denmark for refraining from armed resistance, and the limitation of German interests in Denmark to spheres which did not call for direct German control.

The impalpable and intangible quality of the relations between the occupation authorities and Danish authorities brought about a peculiar situation in the matter of decrees. Since they were not formally interfering with the Danish Government, the Germans could not issue "decrees," much less publish a Verordnungsblatt as they did in other occupied countries. On their side, the Danish authorities took as little

cognizance legally of the occupation as they could, and hence very few laws bearing upon relations with the Germans were published in the regular Danish law gazette. The German authorities appear to have proceeded informally in publicizing their proclamations and regulations, sometimes using placards but more frequently giving releases to the news agency, Ritzaus Bureau, and having them read over the Danish radio, or sending releases direct to the Danish radio.

For a long time Germany tried in Denmark to "kill opposition by kindness," or at least by measures falling short of open punishment. When, in August 1943, Danish opposition and intransigence were climaxed by the resignation of all to the Ministers, Germany introduced a state of police emergency which in turn resulted in the refusal of the Danish central political authorities to participate any longer in the fiction of collaboration. Germany, however, sought to maintain the fiction by refraining from setting up German civil authorities, and by continuing to deal with the Danish administrative heads. Even in 1944, when the Wehrmacht was compelled to declare a state of military law and there was German military government in effect, Germany did not allow the original pretense of alliance administration to be punctured by a proclamation of military government in law.1/

1/ Citations from legal sources can only be given very infrequently. Often decrees and proclamations or significant parts of them were published promptly by Frit Danmark, the weekly publication of the Danish Council in London.

B. GERMAN AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN DENMARK

1. The German Legation

Prior to August 1943 German control was kept at a minimum and operated chiefly behind the scenes. It was exercised largely through the German Legation headed at the time of the invasion and for some time thereafter by von Renthe-Fink. Upon the invasion the title of von Renthe-Fink was changed from Minister to that of Minister Plenipotentiary of the Reich--a higher but apparently undefined status; he continued, however, to be responsible to von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister. The invasion brought with it also an increase in the personnel of the Legation, to take care of the increase in its responsibility. The entire number of German civilians employed in the Embassy, the Consulate and the police, was never large, however, being estimated at some thousands.

On 5 November 1942 von Renthe-Fink was replaced by Werner Best. Best, a Party man, had been chief of the legal division of the Gestapo, and then employed in German military government in France and had also achieved recognition in Nazi circles through his authorship of treatises on constitutional problems of Germany. As chief of the Legation and Consulate he was responsible, like von Renthe-Fink to von Ribbentrop. But he was also given the status of Hitler's special deputy, and in this capacity he was responsible to Hitler alone. The post of special deputy covered all matters directly related to the occupation and to civil collaboration between Germany as occupying power and Denmark. For some months after his arrival in Denmark Dr. Best acted solely as Hitler's special deputy, as it was not until after the beginning of 1943 that he actually presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary.

The staff of the German Legation was kept within relatively

reasonable size until 1943, when it still numbered less than two dozen regular officials. Especially important on the staff of the Minister Plenipotentiary was Gustav Meissner, who, at the time of the invasion, was appointed Press Attaché. He was a protegé of von Ribbentrop and ranked higher in the Party hierarchy than the Minister himself. Meissner concerned himself not only with the control of the press but with all kinds of political activity and relations with the Danish Nazis. Other important members of the Legation were the Press Attaché, Jürgen Schröder,1/ the Police Attaché, Dr. Fest, the Radio Attaché, E. Lohman, and the Film Attaché, F.K. Frielitz. 2/

A report of April 1944 on the Legation's organization indicated the following divisions: (a) Consular Affairs, headed by Secretary Kassler, with a Scandinavian and a Continental section; (b) Commercial Affairs, headed by Consul Krüger; Economic Affairs, in charge of von Erckner; (c) Information Service, under the author Louis von Kohl as acting chief; and a Cultural Division, whose head was Schacht, with sections on press (Schröder), films (Gürnandt), and sports (Volkmann). An envoy named Barandon was said to serve as liaison between Best and the Danish authorities.

In the course of the occupation the German Legation and Consulate developed into rather large administrative bodies with a great volume of activities. The posts were filled by German civilians who were sent up from Germany after training acquired through service under the German Government or in the ranks of the Nazi Party. A certain number of civilian sections maintained systematic liaison with various branches of Danish civil administration, with Danish industry and trade organizations, and with the Danish media of public information

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1/ Schröder replaced Gustav Meissner as Press Attaché on 3 April 1943.

2/ Freilitz was appointed Film Attaché at the time of the invasion, when Gustav Meissner became Press Attaché.

and cultural life. While the personnel of the German civil administration were stationed principally in Copenhagen, there were German consuls in twenty-two provincial cities. Consular officers as well as members of the Legation proper could appear in Danish administrative offices and conduct investigations--sometimes, however, the permission to do so being demanded in the first instance by the German Plenipotentiary.

In the more important cases, affecting the Danish state, relations between the German and the Danish civil machinery were handled through contact on the diplomatic level. The German sections whose investigations in the Danish administration had brought them to some conclusion would make their report to the German Plenipotentiary. He then would make personal contact with the Danish Foreign Minister, who in turn would take up the matter with his Danish colleagues, whose decision, if acquiescent in the German wishes, would be executed by the appropriate Danish administrative departments or Danish trade organizations. But there is ground for believing that in less important matters, not requiring a policy decision by the higher Danish authorities, the Legation and the Consulate made known their desires directly to the Danish administrative heads through their liaison officers stationed in the various Danish agencies. (See below, F2.) After the crisis of August 1943, of course, the German authorities dealt entirely with the administrative heads of the Danish departments, especially with the administrative chief of the Foreign Office.

2. The German Army

The Commander of the Wehrmacht in Denmark enjoyed an authority co-ordinate with that of the Minister Plenipotentiary; neither could over-rule the other. The jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht was, in principle, confined to military matters,

but this limitation did not prevent its activities from coming into relationship with Danish civilian life, especially in economic matters. The Army of Occupation has liaison officers in the principal branches of administration affecting their needs, such as communications, and these officers collaborated more directly with the Danish administration than did the representatives of the Legation.

Successive commanders in chief have directed the Wehrmacht in Denmark: General Leonhard von Kaupisch from the invasion to June 1940; General Erich Lüdke from June 1940 to September 1942; General Hermann von Hanneken, who came from a military industrial board in Germany, for a still longer period--September 1942 until early in February 1945; and finally Generaloberste George K. Lindemann, appointed to succeed Hanneken when the prospect of Allied invasion demanded a more strategically skilled commander.

The headquarters of the Wehrmacht were at first at Hotel d'Angleterre, Copenhagen, but were moved later to Nyboder School, near Osterport Station. The Germans acquired additional space for headquarters by erecting a large building between the school and the station, and the Wehrmacht took over the Danish barracks in Copenhagen, and probably in Jutland too after the expulsion of the Danish Army in November 1942. The size of the German garrison in Denmark, which consisted mainly of second-class troops or of first-class troops resting, varied considerably from time to time; the average figure before 1943 is said to have been the equivalent of about four divisions.

During the first years of the invasion the Wehrmacht attempted to be "correct" in carrying out the intention of non-interference voiced by General Kaupisch in his address to the Danish people on the morning of the invasion. (See A1.) The German military authorities did not assume a very active role

in the control or exploitation of the country until the crisis of August-September 1943, when General von Hanneken proclaimed a state of military emergency. Whereas previously the German Army had acquired supplies by free purchase, Hanneken in September issued decrees establishing the right of the Wehrmacht to requisition. He based these decrees, however, on the Hague Convention, on Land Warfare (Articles 42-56), thereby indicating a desire to adhere in some degree to the original pattern of a restrained occupation. (See below, G2.) While the state of military emergency in the fall of 1943 witnessed other broad and in some cases severe measures of the Wehrmacht against civilian life, the military authorities did not remain in the foreground very long, being soon superseded by the German police as the chief agents in the application of German pressure against the recalcitrant Danes. (See below, H.)

3. The German Police

German police in Denmark were originally of little importance, the few there being present only as observers and having no other headquarters than an office in the Legation. No agreement was ever reached by which German police had the right to take action against Danish citizens. But a regular German police establishment, was set up in February 1941 as the Polizeiverwaltung Dänemark at Dagmarhus on Town Hall Square in the heart of Copenhagen. Its staff, though originally modest, was to grow substantially. Paul Kannstein, a police expert and friend of Himmler, was in charge. He was superseded in the autumn of 1943 by SS Obergruppenführer Günther Pancke.

Pancke was in charge of all German police forces in Denmark, which under his regime assumed a rapidly extending role of interference. He was the representative of Himmler and enjoyed equal rank with Best. Under Pancke were Generalmajor von Heimburg, in charge of the Order Police,1/ and Dr. Molder,

1/ In August 1944 it was reported that Colonel Lorge replaced von Heimburg.

an SS officer, in command of the Security Police (Sipo) and the Security Service (SD). A somewhat detailed report as of April 1944 indicated that the Security Police was composed of seven divisions: (a) Administration (Chantré), (b) Justice (Buncke), (c) Technical Matters (Drescher), (d) Gestapo, (e) Criminal Police, (f) Foreign Office (Pahl), and (g) anti-Komintern (Wesche). Divisions Four and Five, Gestapo and Criminal Police, seemed to have a joint organization with Karl Hoffmann at the head, and with special sections on Communists, Jews and refugees, sabotage, passport control, and counter-espionage. Pahl and Wesche, in charge of divisions Six and Seven, were also deeply involved in another branch, which dealt with sabotage guards and counter-espionage. The Danish underground press claimed that this branch concerned itself with "clearing" murders, and presumably it did its work through the Schalburg Corps. (See below D 4,b.) The Police Attaché at the German Legation, Dr. Fest, served as liaison between Best, Pancke, and the chief of the Danish police, Begtrup-Hansen. Hoffmann of the divisions on state and criminal police supplied the liaison with the Danish Prosecutor on Special Affairs, an office created to handle matters involving both Danes and Germans.

Prior to August 1943, the German police sought to remain as much as possible in the background. In general it confined itself to investigation and to supervising the Danish police in matters of direct interest to Germany; thus when certain arrests were to be made the German police would accompany the Danish to see that they did not evade their duty. German police occasionally made arrests themselves in cases of sabotage but generally turned over the offenders to the Danish police. Only those Danes who committed sabotage against Wehrmacht property were systematically arrested by Germans. (See below, C 7.)

The Germans placed Danes whom they arrested in a section of the Copenhagen Vestre prison which they took over.

The relative non-interference practiced by the German police began to give way to a more obtrusive policy in the fall of 1943, and after midsummer of 1944 the Gestapo was given a relatively free reign. Arrest and raids became the order of the day. Prisoners convicted of one crime were held in custody and later executed as retribution for another. Torture was frequent. Nearly ten thousand Danish patriots were placed under arrest and of these possibly four thousand were deported to Germany. (See below, H.)

4. German Military Courts

German military courts 1/ --Army, Navy, and Air Forces-- came in with the occupation but were inconspicuous and confined their operations to misdemeanors against the Wehrmacht. When the occupation grew more severe they began to concern themselves with Danish subjects; court martial sentence of six years for a seventeen-year old apprentice in June 1940 may have been the first case. More and more the German military courts interfered in the Danish administration of justice, sending Danish citizens to prison without reference to Danish law, and in some cases sending Danes to Germany for imprisonment. After 1943 the Germans freely used the death penalty (it had been abolished in Denmark).2/ On 23 May Best renewed a decree of Hanneken's summing up the lines on which German courts pronounced sentence. Death was ordained in severe cases for violence against members of the Wehrmacht or against other German authority, for attacks on their interest or property, for possessing fire arms or radio transmitters, for training radio technicians without permission, for aiding members of Allied forces, and for fostering unrest among workers.

1/ See "Military and Police Tribunals in Occupied Europe" Part Two, III.
2/ For SS and Police Courts, which eventually came into existence, see below, H 3.

While there was no regular relation between the German military courts and local Danish courts, the close relations between German police and Danish judicial authorities enabled the German military tribunals in practice to use the results of Danish investigations.

5. German Organizations in Denmark

The German community consisted of two groups: (a) the Reichsdeutsche who came in after the invasion to participate in the occupation and who numbered about ten thousand in 1943 (including evacuated children), and (b) the Volksdeutsche minority in South Jutland numbering about twenty-eight thousand of whom two-thirds spoke the local Danish dialect. It was German policy to keep the organization and exploitation of these two groups at a minimum in order to foster the idea of the "Model protectorate".

a. NSDAP Organizations for Reichsdeutsche

The NSDAP classified Denmark as a national group (Landesgruppe Dänemark), and the local chief was National Group Leader Dalldorf. As the Auslandsorganization representative in Denmark, he functioned as the liaison between the Party and the Reichsdeutsche in the country. Since the German colony was smaller than in other countries and high policy discouraged an elaborate organization, Dalldorf's influence was circumscribed. The following organizations did operate in Denmark:

1) The German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront). The DAF was not important until 1943, when the manpower stringencies of the war led to a change in leadership and plans were laid to create a national labor chamber to assist the leader in utilizing labor more effectively, especially women.

2) The Women's Section of the NSDAP: The Women's Section was started by three enterprising Nazi ladies in Copenhagen, apparently on their own initiative. Its functions

were to care for wounded and sick soldiers, look after their families and evacuated Hamburg children, conduct Nazi celebrations, spead the German language and culture, and care for female Wehrmacht employees. In many of these services it cooperated with the National Socialistische Volkswohlfahrt.

3) The Propaganda Section of the NSDAP: This office seems to have confined itself to spreading Nazi culture through showing films at hospitals, maintaining libraries, and promoting music.

4) The Racial-Political Office of the NSDAP: Since the Danes were a Germanic people and racially satisfactory, German soldiers were permitted to marry Danish women. This office examined the racial suitability of the prospective spouse.

5) The Winterhilfswerk and Deutsches Rotes Kreux: These organizations collected funds for various relief activities, of which 74 percent went to the front or Germany.

6) The NSV-Kinderverschickung. This organization was charged with administering the transfer of, and care for, children evacuated from Hamburg during the heavy raids on that city. About seven thousand children were handled in 1943.

7) Youth organizations. Local branches of the Hitler Jugend and the Bund Deutscher Mädel operated in Denmark.

8) German schools. The German St. Petri School was maintanined to indoctrinate German youth with Nazi ideology. The school proved to be inadequate, and in 1943 construction of a new one was undertaken at Tuborgvey. The drafting of teachers placed a serious strain upon educational activities.

9) Skagerrak. This was the official publication of the NSDAP, and was designed to maintain contact between the Germans in Denmark and in the home country. Its circulation in 1943 was about five thousand.

10) The German Volksdeutsche Minority in South Jutland.

The German minority in South Jutland was well-organized and articulate even before Hitler's assumption of power. The Danish Government established a Ministry of South Jutland Affairs which made substantial concessions in the direction of cultural autonomy in order to win over the group, but these efforts were not successful. After 1933 the NSDAP took over the minority organizations in South Jutland and expanded them. Propaganda, German schools, and land purchasing were encouraged. The Party was split into factions which were temporarily united in 1935 under Landesführer Dr. Jens Møller a veterinary surgeon who during occupation remained the leader of the NSDAP Nordschleswigs. An SA formation was set up called Schleswigsche Kameradschaften (SK). These organizations provoked incidents which served as bargaining weapons in Germany's negotiations with the Danish Government, usually over a trade treaty.

With the invasion in 1940, the local Nazis expected that the "bleeding sore of North Scheswig" would be cauterized. No such development took place. The minority, in fact, exerted no influence over national affairs until the Folketing election in March 1943. At that time Best apparently granted the Danes permission to conduct the election in return for the establishment of a special bureau for mi nority affairs, not related to the Ministry of South Jutland Affairs, attached to th government in Copenhagen. Leadership of the bureau was given to Rudolf Stehr, the Party progaganda director. Little has been heard of the bureau's affairs and it is probably safe

to assume that it has not played an important role.

The NSDAP strengthened its control over the South Jutland Germans since 1940, retaining old organizations and forming new ones. The SK was enlarged, particularly after Lieutenant P. Larsen took over leadership in 1941. Its functions were to build morale, recruit for the Waffen-SS, and train leaders for South Jutland. After the invasion of the USSR, it instituted a vigorous program of "volunteering" for the Wehrmacht that included terror and economic pressure. As a result of the Reich manpower decree of January 1943, a program of manpower mobilization was instituted. Corporative trade groups of handicraftsmen, merchants, farmers, and workers were organized for more effective control of the local economy. An expansion of German schools was undertaken early in the occupation which did not prove successful. The enrollments dropped as a result of German defeats and the drafting of teachers. The principal minority newspaper, as before the invasion, continued to be the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung. The old program of buying up Danish property was expanded.

C. THE ROLE OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO AUGUST 1943

1. German Pressure on the Danish Government

In the first stage of the occupation, from 9 April 1940 to August 1943, the German occupying authorities attempted to gain their ends by exerting various pressures on the existing governmental agencies. Requests of the German government or the occupation authorities were presented to the Danish Government by the German Minister or by the Commander of the German Armed Forces in Denmark. The Danish Government tried through negotiations, meeting some requests and rejecting others, to forestall as many of their demands as possible. In their negotiations the German representatives used mainly the threat that, if their requests should not be complied with, they would not be bound by the promise of 9 April 1940 to safeguard the Danish Government and institutions, or that they would cut off the importation of German coal and fuel.

When Eric Scavenius became Minister of Foreign Affairs in a cabinet reshuffle in July 1940, just after the fall of France, he issued a statement on foreign policy 1/ which alienated many Danes because it seemed to yield too much to the Germans. Scavenius, who had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs also in World War I, was firmly convinced that Germany would win World War II. He observed that the German fleet had saved Danish neutrality in 1914-18, and that the German Army had done likewise in 1940. Scavenius declared that the aims of Danish policy should be under all circumstances to avoid conflict with Germany, and in the future New Order in Europe to find its place in mutual active co-operation with Greater Germany.

1/ Gudme, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

The Germans wished to know whether Scavenius sought closer relations with Germany. When he answered verbally in the affirmative, the German negotiator, von Ritter, said that one of the German desires was a currency and customs union between Germany and Denmark. On 1 August Scavenius called together the Committee of Nine (see C 4) and told them that a delegation was soon going to Berlin to open negotiations which would concern economic union between the two countries. Once in Berlin the delegation, which included Gunnar Larsen, the new Minister of Transport, an admirer of Scavenius, learned the real extent of the concessions intended; Danish trade agreements with other countries were to be denounced, future treaties were to be only with Germany, Germans were to have the rights of Danish citizens in Denmark, and Danish citizens equivalent status in Germany. The delegation could not agree, and upon its return the true nature of Scavenius' negotiations became known. In a Cabinet meeting in mid-August the Ministers one by one, in the presence of King and Crown Prince, denounced the project for a customs and currency union. In order to place a better appearance on things a new delegation was sent to Berlin proposing postponement of the negotiations. The Germans agreed but intimated that when the matter came up again conditions would be less favorable.

On two occasions the Germans made demands in conflict with the promise offered on 9 April that the Danish Army and Navy were to be maintained. The first demand was made in January 1941 when Germany sought the loan of eight Danish torpedo boats. When the Danish Government protested that this would be out of line with the "promise" of 9 April, the Germans stated that they wanted only to use the boats for training crews in the Baltic. The Danish Government

again refused. Thereupon the Germans confronted the King with a direct threat that, unless the ships were delivered, deliveries of coal to Denmark would cease. Meanwhile the Danes had taken the precaution of removing technical equipment ashore, where a mysterious fire subsequently destroyed it. The King delivered a strong speech of protest to the naval personnel concerned, but this was as far as the Danes were prepared to go. Six ships (out of the eight demanded) had come into the possession of German marines by 5 February. In November 1942 the Germans demanded the withdrawal of all Danish garrisons from Jutland to the further side of the Great Belt within fourteen days. The Danish Government, at this time directly threatened with deplacement by the Germans, complied without official protest so far as is known, although managing to secure German acquiescence in the delivery of a substantially smaller quantity of military stores than the Germans had demanded.

2. The King

The fact that the Germans and Danes were in theory treated on a basis of equal sovereignty was due in no small measure to the position of the King. King Christian assumed from the beginning a correct but reserved attitude, yielding as little as possible when not forced to do so. Always popular, he became during the occupation the idol of his people as the symbol of national resistance, and any effort on the part of the Germans to interfere with his person would have aroused the entire nation. Thus the German authorities were bound to treat the King with some measure of respect, which made it possible for the King with his long experience to resist successfully on small points and to delay German action on larger ones. The Germans well aware that the King had stated that he would abdicate sooner than accept any cabinet which lacked the support of the majority

in the Folketing, apparently did not care to face the consequences of interference. Accordingly, the Germans had to acquiesce as the King became more and more a rallying point of national sentiments.

3. The Cabinet

Theoretically the Cabinet remained a constitutional one during the occupation; that is, it was appointed by the King on the basis of majority support in the Folketing. But in practice its make-up at any one moment was the result of two forces -- pressure from the occupation authorities and from Berlin, and counter-pressure from the political parties to assure the incumbency of Ministers who had the support of the Rigsdag.

The day after the invasion the Government, made up of Social Democrats and Radicals, was turned into a Coalition Government by adding three members each from the Left and the Conservative parties. The resulting Cabinet of eighteen members was unwieldy and on 8 July 1940 there was a reorganization. At this point pro-German and non-party members were introduced in the persons of Scavenius as Foreign Minister, Gunnar Larsen as Minister of Public Works, and Harold Petersen as Minister of Justice. Cabinet voting on critical issues was apt to be three pro-German votes to eight national votes, with Premier Stauning supporting Scavenius on foreign issues.

Considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Cabinet to adopt anti-Communist measures. Two days after the German invasion of Bucois the Danish Government recalled its mission from Moscow and broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. Its declaration stated that "there is a common interest in this conflict under German leadership, which will contribute decisively in protecting

European countries from internal disintegration." After the German Army marched into Russia, increased pressure was exerted on the Danish Cabinet for accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. On 20 November Scavenius announced that the German Minister had invited Denmark to join in the Pact, but the step was opposed by two-thirds of the Ministers despite the support of Stauning, Scavenius, Gunnar Larsen, and the second non-political member of the Government, Thune Jacobsen. Despite the threatened resignation of a minority of the Ministers and the consequent overthrow of the government, sufficient pressure was exerted by the German Minister, who let it be known that, failing submission, Germany would revoke her promises of 9 April 1940 to force the Cabinet to support the measure. Scavenius then presented himself in Berlin to sign the Pact in company with Finland and the German satellite powers.

In order to justify the action of the Cabinet to the Danish public, which felt humiliated over the Pact, the Danish Foreign Ministry was careful to point out in its announcement of 25 November 1941 adherence to the pact "does not impose political or other obligations, neither does it affect Denmark's status as a non-belligerent state." Scavenius, further, secured German consent to the publication of several paragraphs which circumscribed Danish obligations under the Pact in such a way as not to compromise Denmark's status as a non-belligerent. In order to reassure public opinion the secretary of the Committee of Nine (See C 4) issued a statement, saying that the Pact "contains no other obligations than that of which complete and full information has been given in the Governments' declaration," and reminding the public that

"it is still the duty of every patriotic citizen to follow the King's appeal and to maintain quiet and order."

Before Stauning died in May 1942 German pressure affected the make-up of the Cabinet on two occasions. In October 1940 Christmas Møller, the Conservative leader, was driven from the Cabinet, and soon afterwards from political activity generally. Petersen's laxness in quelling an anti-German demonstration at a Dano-German football match on Constitution Day, 5 June 1941, led to the appointment of E. Thune Jacobsen, who stood well with the Germans, as Minister of Justice. When Stauning became ill, Vilhelm Buhl, a Social Democrat, was given a provisional appointment as Prime Minister, while another Social Democrat was brought in as Finance Minister, with the result that the pro-German vote was not increased. Buhl leaned to the patriot side but had to issue a statement of policy favorable to the Germans.

In September 1942 Berlin precipitated a crisis over a birthday telegram from Hitler to King Christian, and for a long time the Danes were not clear as to what the Germans really wanted. In November a change of ministers was arranged, Buhl being replaced by Scavenius. Berlin interpreted the change as favorable to its interests. Buhl and three other strong party men left the Government. Five new ministers took their places , the Ministry of Social Affairs being separated from the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Communications from that of Public Works. Of the five new Ministers one was a Venstre representative (see D 1, b) of good repute, two were civil servants not likely to strengthen relations with the Rigsdag and two were suspected of pro-German sympathies. One of these, Højberg-Christensen, the Minister of Education, had been one of the founders of the German-Danish Association; the other , Laurits Hansen, was the Social Democratic chairman of the Danish National Federation of Trade Unions, who had visited Germany after the occupation

and (though not definitely compromised) had spoken against sabotage.

Scavenius combined the post of Foreign Minister with that of Prime Minister. His procedures were in some ways autocratic; he dealt with his Ministers as individuals more than as a corporate group. His declaration of policy announced that his Government would tolerate no sabotage or other acts of violence, "which are directly or indirectly aimed against the occupying forces." He promptly sponsored the Power of Attorney Bill formally called the Temporary Law on Giving the Government Authorization, which seriously limited the power of the Rigsdag, (See C 4). In the end, as in the case of Buhl, it was sabotage which brought Scavenius to the end of his tenure. He had not proven as effective an instrument as the Germans had expected, for sabotage increased markedly in the summer of 1943. When General von Hanneken on 29 August proclaimed a state of military emergency, Scavenius and his Cabinet resigned, and no successors were chosen.

4. The Rigsdag

From the beginning of the occupation the German authorities exercised strong pressure on the Rigsdag to introduce legislation which would meet their requirements. Accordingly the following Danish enactments were published: a law requiring the deposit of certain naval and radio apparatus; 1/ a law prohibiting the photographing of German military establishments; 2/ a law to control the private possession of firearms; 3/ a law on importation of or trade in firearms and munitions; 4/ a law concerning movement in military zones; 5/ a law prohibiting photographing

1/ Lovtidend, A, No. 41, 17 April 1940.
2/ Ibid., No. 47, 1 May 1940.
3/ Ibid., No. 53, 11 May 1940.
4/ Ibid., No. 59, 24 May 1940.
5/ Ibid., No. 110, 5 November 1940.

of bombed areas and damaged ships. 1/ The Penal Code was supplemented by provisions establishing penalties for giving information on military establishments and military forces and for aiding opponents of the military forces occupying Denmark, 2/ and by several laws concerning navigation, etc. 3/ German authorities exercised strong pressure upon the Danish Government to introduce, first, anti-Jewish legislation and regulations for deporting Danish Jews, and, second, anti-communistic legislation after Denmark's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Danish Government, especially King Christian, categorically opposed the first request, and, consequently, no anti-Jewish legislation was enacted.

The German pressure for the enactment of anti-Communistic legislation, however, was more successful. On August 1941 the Minister of Justice introduced a bill for the suppression of all Communist Associations, which the Riksdag promptly enacted.

The enactment of the Power of Attorney Bill, by which the Rigsdag was induced to sign away its most important constitutional powers, was forced through the assembly immediately after the appointment of the Scavenius Government in November 1942. By this law the Government obtained almost unrestricted power to deprive any citizen whatever of his liberty. The preamble to this decisive measure, which might be termed a substitute rather than a supplement for the Constitution, read as follows:

> The Government is empowered by royal decree to prepare prohibitions or instructions for the maintenance of peace, order, and security to the extent that it may be felt necessary to deal with acts which, in the existing grave situation with the

1/ Ibid., No. 118, 9 December 1940.
2/ Ibid., No. 3, 20 January 1941.
3/ Ibid., No. 346, 16 August 1941; No. 53, 20 August 1941; No. 359, 22 August 1941; No. 55, 29 August 1941.

country occupied by German troops, are calculated to endanger national interests. With reference to the imposition of penalties it is declared in the proposal that they shall be fixed within the limits given in the common penal law. There shall be established a committee with reference to the rules in paragraph 49 of the Constitution, and this committee shall be immediately informed of the decrees that are made, and the committee may require further information.

The authorization of the Government to issue decrees and ordinances "to the extent deemed necessary to counteract actions which...may be designed to endanger the interests of the country" seriously limited the importance of the Rigsdag. In effect, however, the law was more important in reserve than in use, for Scavenius was reluctant to apply it.

The important parliamentary committees were somewhat slighted. The Foreign Affairs Committee was consulted on important issues in 1940, but increasingly Scavenius ignored it and by November 1941 it had lost influence over the Minister. The Finance Committee continued to deal with important monetary and economic questions. An important role, however, fell to a new committee, the Committee of Nine. Set up in July 1940, it was composed of two members from the four major parties and one member from the Rights' League. The latter served as the Committee's permanent secretary. The chairmanship of the Committee rotated among the four major parties at three-month intervals.

The purpose of the Committee was twofold: to serve as the body to implement the party truce decided upon for the duration, and to function as the link between the Cabinet and the Rigsdag, especially during interims between parliamentary sessions, in order to make sure that Cabinet business did not imperil the Coalition. Normally, important legislative proposals were submitted to the

Committee before being presented to the Rigsdag. In the successive crises over relations with Germany, the Committee was in the center of discussion of financial changes; the Committee sat with several Ministers in a group presided over by the Minister of Finance. After the August crisis in 1943 which led to voluntary suspension of the Rigsdag, the Committee remained the link between the parties. Its existence was informal evidence that the party coalition continued intact. There were reasons for believing that without the Committee of Nine the Rigsdag, in the first three years, might have yielded more than it did under German pressure.

5. The Danish Armed Forces

a. The Army

The principal Danish defenses were on the Islands rather than on Jutland. The Danish-German frontier was virtually undefended. The Army consisted of two divisions, the Zealand Division for the Islands and the Jutland Division for the mainland and Funen. There was a system of military conscription. The Army presented virtually no opposition to the German invasion in 1940; total casualties were thirty-six. In fact, the Army was not even mobilized.

In order to preserve the "model protectorate" principle, the German Command permitted the Danish Army to exist and conscript men during the early years of the occupation, secure in the knowledge that it presented no threat to their own forces. In November 1942, however, this situation changed as a result of German military reverses and the arrival of General von Hanneken, who desired the liquidation of the Danish armed forces. All Danish troops were removed from Jutland to the Islands, and

the Germans obtained the surrender of much of the Army's equipment, including 60,000 rifles (half the total) and 943 machine guns.

In the summer of 1943, the Germans tried to have the Danish Government amend the Army regulations to permit Danish officers volunteer for service in the German and Finnish armies. This demand was complied with in part; the pension regulations were amended to permit foreign service to be reckoned in Danish pensions. The results were not impressive. It is reported that only three officers volunteered, two of them for the Finnish Army.

b. The Navy

The Danish Navy was one of the smallest in the world with only two thousand men to man the fleet, the naval air force, and the coast defenses. It was not engaged in the events of 9 April 1940. In the first three years of the occupation, the Germans did little to disturb the Danish Navy except to demand six torpedo boats, which were taken in February 1941.

6. The Danish Police

So far as concerned Danish citizens, the maintenance of law and order was from the beginning of the occupation claimed by the Denmark Government as the exclusive prerogative of its own police force. The German authorities acquiesced in this except for cases of sabotage or other direct assault upon the occupant's safety, although, as indicated above (see B 3) they for a long time limited the use of German police to a relatively few, flagrant cases. In these cases the Danish Government protested, in other respects too in the earlier years of occupation there were foreshadowings of the difficulties over the police issue which ruptured the relations of the German and Danish

governments after August 1943. On the one hand, the German police, while seeking to make their direct activities as little obtrusive as possible, sought more and more to utilize the Danish police in securing the apprehension of the opponents of collaboration. On the other hand, the rank and file of Danish police, despite the compliance of certain leaders, such as the Copenhagen Chief of Police, J.P.H. Stamm, and his two assistants, showed that they were predominantly anti-German and in many cases found ways of evading the duties of repression imposed upon them by the Germans.

During the earlier stage, the chief impacts of the German occupation upon the Danish police as an organization concerned certain formal changes made by the Danish authorities to adjust their set-up and activities to the new conditions.

a. Expansion

An increase in the personnel of the Danish police set in at the beginning of the war but was accelerated by the German occupation. Numbering only 3,600 men at the outset of the war, the Danish force increased successively until with certain auxiliaries it numbered over 11,000. The fact that the Chief of the National Police, Thune Jacobsen, was promoted to Minister of Justice, and thereby came into ultimate control of the policies affecting police, was a major cause of this increase in personnel. Jacobsen was in a position to press for greater governmental support of expenditures for police, and he used the argument that if the Danish police should be unable to fulfil their duties the Germans would undoubtedly take over the administration of police affairs.

b. Change in Administrative Control

Jacobsen's appointment as Minister of Justice

served also as an occasion to bring the police force completely under the administrative control of the Ministry. This was effected by the setting up of a new department in the Ministry to provide direct contact between the Minister and the police. Such a move brought about the greater control that was necessary if the delicate relations with the occupation authorities were to be handled effectively. The new department was also designed to improve these relations in that it was to have supervision of police cases affecting the Wehrmacht, such as were the concern of the "Public Prosecutor for Special Business."

c. New Police Functions and Organs

The occupation resulted in new duties for the Danish police and thus necessitated the assumption of new police functions and the creation of additional police organs.

The most important change made to meet the new duties was the creation in May 1941 of a separate branch of the police known as the "Coastal Security Police." The duty of this branch was to watch the coast of Denmark and to examine all incoming and outgoing vessels. At the same time the Coastal Security Police performed other police work, such as enforcing blackout regulations or preventing theft from vacant shop buildings.

Other specialized police services were also created for wartime needs. The Harbor Police were employed to guard ships in harbors. The Railway Police, consisting of about one thousand police and one thousand railwaymen, were used to guard railway lines, stations, bridges, and locomotive depots. The Crisis Police (Krisepoliti) were set up to enforce the numerous price control and anti-black-market regulations.

Allied air raids made it necessary to create the State Civilian Air Defense (Statens Civile Luftvaern). Administratively it was placed under the Ministry of the Interior, but the national officer in charge was the Deputy Chief of the National Police, Arthur Dahl, who could deal directly with local authorities. The local chiefs of police were made District Leaders of Civilian Defense.

7. The Danish Courts

The Danish judicial system remained intact and continued to administer German law throughout the German occupation. As has already been indicated, however, (see above, B 4), German military tribunals at an early date began encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the Danish courts by trying Danish saboteurs and other offenders against German military security. In this issue, as in that of arrests by German police, the Danish Government from the outset took a strong stand in defense of its jurisdiction. Prior to the resignation of the Danish central political authorities in the fall of 1943, the Danish Government succeeded in confining this transgression of its jurisdiction to a relatively small number of cases. In general, such cases were tried by German military tribunals without notice to the Danish authorities, that is, without open challenge to their authority. Whenever the Danish Government learned of Danish citizens being seized and detained by German police, it protested vigorously and in most cases, sooner or later, brought about their delivery to Danish prisons pending trial before Danish courts.

One concession was made by the Danish Government to the German authorities in this issue, in the form of an amendment to the Administration of Justice Act. On 21 May 1941 this Act was amended to the effect that, in order to provide secrecy in cases where relations with a

foreign power required it, the employment of lay judges and of jurymen would be dispensed with by decision of the Supreme Court. It was also provided that the court in which the case was to be heard might deny the accused the right to select counsel. This amendment was one of several cases of legislation, passed in compliance with German wishes, which violated the spirit of the Danish Constitution, based upon the supremacy of law and justice.

The appointment of von Hanneken as Commander in Chief in October 1942 brought with it a stiffening of the German policy in regard to Danes accused of offenses against Wehrmacht property and attempted sabotage. Previously the German Commander in Chief had grudgingly conceded the right of Danish courts to try all cases involving Danish citizens, but von Hanneken was willing to continue this concession only so far as concerned acts of sabotage which, though detrimental to German interests, were directed against Danish property -- factories, communications, material, etc. He insisted that the Wehrmacht have jurisdiction over offenses against its own property, and that the Wehrmacht in such cases was entitled to call in German police as its instrument.

The Danish Government was not in a position to resist this policy, but it continued to contend for the proposition that Danes should be punished only by Danes. Thus it opened a special hard labor division at Horsens prison, where German sentences of hard labor against Danes could be carried out, although the Danish penal code prohibits hard labor as a penalty.

D. POLITICAL PARTIES, THE DANISH NAZIS, AND PARA-MILITARY FORMATIONS

1. The Non-Nazi Parties

When Germany invaded Russia, Danish authorities, under German pressure, proscribed the three representatives of the Communists from the Rigsdag, and, in August 1941 the Rigsdag passed a bill for the suppression of all Communist associations and activity. With this exception, the political parties, throughout the occupation, continued their activities apparently without serious opposition. The four major parties -- the Social Democrats, the Left (Liberal) Party, the Conservative People's Party, and the Radical Left -- maintained the same relative positions as they had held before the invasion.

a. The Social Democrats

The Social Democrats, who had obtained 64 seats in the Folketing (with 730,000 votes) and 35 seats in the Landsting (with 509,000 votes) in the elections of 1939, continued the strongest party of the coalition government. The party owed its support not only to the urban industrial masses but also to the comparatively small elements in Danish rural life which are more interested in social services than in private property. The party program was moderate, although it always kept as its ultimate aim the socialization of the means of production. Despite the death of their veteran leader, Thorvald Stauning, the Copenhagen workers and their counterpart elsewhere in the country on the whole stood fast by social democracy, which, they probably felt, presents at bottom the most complete contrast to the form of social organization which was favored by Denmarks German oppressors.

When, in 1941, Knud Kristensen succeded the party leadership a veteran leader who had been discredited by advocacy of co-operation with the Germans, the party took a more vigorous

anti-German stand. Kristensen was included in the group of four political leaders whose exclusion from office the Germans demanded at the time of the formation of the Scavenius government in November 1942.

b. The Left (Liberal) Party (Venstre)

The Venstre, the party with the longest continuous history in Danish public life, in 1939 elected 30 members to the Folketing with 309,000 votes, and 18 members to the Landsting with 248,000 votes. Its membership consisted mainly of farm-owning or farm-holding peasants and those social groups, such as teachers in rural schools and certain traders, who depend on them. The party was interested mainly in free trade and an economic policy favoring the peasants; its position during the occupation was influenced by the fact that the Germans were paying good prices for agricultural products and that farmers were inclined to make the best of the situation.

c. The Conservative People's Party

The Conservative People's Party in 1939 obtained 26 seats in the Folketing (with 302,000 votes), and 13 seats in the Landsting (with 236,000 votes). The party traditionally had the support of Court circles, large landowners, civil servants, and the middle class of the towns, strengthened by the support of large industrial interests and their dependents. Although as a People's Party it was not disposed openly to oppose the extension of the social services, as a party representing industrial interests it strongly advocated tariffs and gained the support of Army circles by advocating the maintenance of military service and national defense.

During the occupation the party played a leading part in patriotic ventures, largely with the skillful leadership of Christmas Møller, who conducted nation-wide meetings in the autumn of 1940 after the Germans had excluded him from the government.

d. The Radical Left (Radikale Venstre)

The Radical Left Party has throughout its existence been the smallest of the four major parties, receiving 14 seats in the Folketing (with 162,000 votes) in the 1939 elections. The party linked together a rather doctrinal type of intellectual democrat with literary and free-thinking elements, with small craftsmen and the rural classes of farm laborers and small land-holders. The Radical Left has consistently followed the policy of reducing Denmark's defenses and was much discredited in 1940 by the complete fiasco which attended its policy of disarmament and appeasement of Germany.

e. Inter-Party Co-operation

Under the occupation, the Political Parties continued to hold their local and national meetings and conducted their newspapers on party lines. Much discussion was kept alive on issues not relevant to the occupation. Yet the four major parties, together with the League of Rights, were determined not to allow party rivalry to give the Germans any advantage. An inter-party agreement of 2 July 1940 set up a joint working committee (See D 4) and drew up a joint statement of policy declaring the intention to preserve the existing constitution and to lay aside party disagreement.

By August 1941 the parties were agreed that on four types of German demands they would not yield. These were: (1) any effort to commit Denmark to agreements beyond the period of the war, (2) anti-Allied military activity, (3) anti-Semitic legislation, and (4) departure from the basis of parliamentary democracy, as in forming a government.

The best evidence of the leaders' success was the outcome of the general election on 23 March 1943. The fact that a democratic parliamentary election was permitted at all under the Nazi occupation reflected the German desire to keep

up the appearance of a "model protectorate." In return for permission to hold the election Scavenius evidently agreed to place the affairs of the German minority in North Slesvig under a separate office in the Cabinet. By this arrangement the German authorities kept the minority from registering an opinion by ballot and also created a precedent for controlling it as part of the German community proper.

The results of the election showed the democratic party system at work in full vigor. A record electorate turned out, 88.5 percent of those eligible voting. The relative strength of the four major parties was maintained. The Social Democrats gained two seats while their allies, the Radicals, the party of Scavenius, lost one. The Conservatives capitalized some of the activist sentiment and gained five seats while the old Left Party lost two. Among the minor parties, the League of Rights lost one; the fresh aggressive Dansk Samling party of Anders Sørensen won three; the DNSAP retained three; and the Peasant Party retained two. 1/

Though the crisis of August 1943 made superfluous the collaboration of the parties, there are reasons for believing that the collaboration continued under cover. The party leaders were not closely identified with the active resistance forces, and it appeared that the party organizations continued more or less intact. On the whole the party organizations maintained a defensive position. On the whole the party organizations maintained a defensive position. At no time were the occupying authorities able to use them for their purposes with any effectiveness.

1/ The distribution of membership in the Rigsdag was: Social Democrats, 66; Radicals, 13; Conservatives, 31; Left, 28; League of Rights, 2; Dansk Samling, 3; DNSAP, 3; the Peasant Party, 2.

2. The Danish Nazi Parties

In view of their increasing difficulties after August 1943, it might have seemed odd that the Germans did not, as in Norway, turn to the Danish Nazis and assign to them the burden of governing the country under close supervision of the occupying power. The basic reason for the reluctance of the occupying authorities to entrust responsibility to the Danish Nazis was prehaps the splintered character of the National Socialist movement in Denmark.

a. The Splinter Groups

A Danish Nazi party founded on a crude imitation of the German party system, was founded by a Nane named Lembcke in 1929, but it was dissolved by the middle thirties. Among its members were Danes who were to reappear in Nazi roles, such as Carlis Hansen or Frits Clausen. Some time later a retired lieutenant of the Danish Army, Wilfred Petersen, formed a Danish Socialist Party, recruited from the most irresponsible elements, which in the second half of the 'thirties carried out many acts of terrorism. Petersen emerged in 1941 as the leader of Dansk Folkeparti and Det Nationale Genrejsningsparti.

Other would-be leaders on the Danish scene, each with his own little "party," were S.E. Johansen, Reverend Anders Malling, E. Vaaben, V. Purschel, and Kaj Finck, whose party was made up of a group of dissidents from Frits Clausen's party. A "party" around Aage H. Andersen, which enjoyed the support of the noted authoress, Olga Eggers, eventually became the Danish Anti-Jewish League (Dansk Anti-Jødisk Liga). It issued The Battle Sign (Kamptignet), in effect a Danish version of Streicher's Der Stürmer. Publication ceased in 1943 after Andersen and his feminine collaborator served prison sentences for libel.

In the midst of the malaise brought upon Danish agriculture by the world depression the Land Users' Association

(Landbrugernes Sammenslutning). The rallies organized under its auspices in a few years grew to surprising dimensions. But it became evident that the leadership was tied to a clique of large proprietors, 1/ several of whom had German antecedents and sympathies. This was the element which came to weigh heavily also in Frits Clausen's party.

b. The Danish National Socialist Worker Party (Dansk Nationale Sveialistiske Arbeiderparti -- DNSAP) or Clausen Party

The DNSAP was the party of Frits Clausen, though it was much less his personal creation than was Nasjonal Samling in Norway the creation of Vidkun Quisling. Clausen was a local physician from Bovrup in Slesvig, a man of very common talents, and with no personal magnetism to qualify him as a leader. He lacked Quisling's political experience and personal friendship with Hitler. The DNSAP, however, emerged as the favored Danish Nazi group. It has been the only one to elect members to the Rigsdag, filling three seats since 1939.

The German Minister, von Renthe-Fink, and his Press Attaché Meissner, a zealous Nazi Party worker, hoped in the summer of 1940 to make Clausen the head of a Danish Nazi government. Clausen was always available to propagandize German policies to the best of his abilities in the Folketing and in the national campaigns of oratory in which he indulged. Accordingly, the German Minister, acting through his Press Attaché, subsidised the DNSAP party with a grant amounting at one time to from six to seven hundred thousand kronen a month. The Nazi agitation, by which Clausen hoped to secure his inclusion in the Danish Cabinet at the German demand, was planned to reach its climax at a meeting and demonstration in Copenhagen on 17 November 1940. The demonstration, however, proved to be not only unpopular but impotent.

1/ These proprietors were organized for a time in the Majoratsejernes Forening (Large Owners' Union).

Clausen's party gained some strength from Landbrugernes Sammenslutning, particularly from a faction called the "Barons' Union." This aristocratic wing had been formed in 1940 to work for Clausen and to oppose the Social Democratic policies of the Stauning Ministry in Copenhagen. Leaders of this group were Baron Raben-Levetzau, Baron Otto Rosenørn-Lehn, and Count F. Knuth. Other landed magnates who hoped to profit from Clausen's movement were Count Knuth-Knuthenborg, an experienced agitator, and Count Bent Holstein, who in 1918 -19 had intrigued against the Danish Government in order to retrieve more of Slesvig for Denmark than was approved in Copenhagen. On the business side Clausen's interests were looked after by three brothers by the name of Bryld. They were of rural background and had been active in professional and business interests of a somewhat unsavory character.

The organization of DNSAP remained somewhat rudimentary. A teachers' union (NSLF) was formed -- at its first meeting in April 1942 its membership approached a hundred -- as was also a Students' Section (Studenterfraktion). An author's union was referred to in January 1942, as was also a "culture corporation" in April the same year. A sports section was known after June 1941 as the Storm Section (Storm Afdeling), though it was little in evidence. A Farm Labor Service (Lands Arbejdstjenesten) set up a number of work camps and launched a school for training leaders at Ravnehus, Hareskoven, in North Sjaelland. On the provincial level the country was divided into seventeen provinces (syssler) with a sysselleder or provincial party leader in charge of each.

After the fiasco in November 1940, when the weakness of the Danish Nazis was as obvious to the German masters as to loyal Danes, the fortunes of the Nazis took on a miscellaneous character. Even in November 1942, when Scavenius was forming

his Ministry according to German dictation in Berlin, he was able to resist Ribbentrop's proposals for a Nazi Minister of Defense from the Fricorps and a Nazi Minister of Justice from the civil service. The inclusion of Clausen himself in the ministry was apparently not seriously discussed. After that date Clausen's prestige suffered further eclipse in the general election; many of his followers left him; his newspaper Faedrelandet was given a new editorial board and a new editorial policy by the German Minister. In 1944 Clausens' party disintegrated, and in an "Order of the Day" of 5 May 1944 he dissolved his party. The opposition which had been forming, led by Ejnar Jørgensen, Capt. Paul Sommer, and Commander Martinsen, were associated with the Schalburg group. Those faithful to Clausen's faction were led by a "Council of Leaders," made up of C.P. Jørgensen, Th. Larsen, and Holger Johnson, who condemned the defection of the opposition and of Faedrelandet. Clausen himself, reported placed in a house for inebriates at Warzburg, returned to private life at Bovrup in North Slesvig.

c. New Combinations

The process of fragmentation among the other Danish Nazi groups was also marked by dissolutions and new combinations. Wilfred Petersen's Dansk Folkeparti was formed in March 1941 as an amalgamation of Nationalt Samvirke, (Fagstatbevaegelse), Dansk Socialistisk Parti, Det Nationale Genrejsningsparti. In July 1942 Den Nationale Aktion was founded as an amalgamation of Den National Blok, Dansk Enhedsparti, Det Danske Arbejdsfaelleskab, Den Danske Front and Danske Samlings og Korporationsparti. In August 1941 Axel Hartel founded Dansk Anti-Kommunisme, National Studenter Aktion, a group outside the student section of Clausen's party. The Schleswigsche Kameradschaft continued to flourish as if it were a branch

of Hitler's own party.

3. Collaborators and Sympathizers

As long as Denmark retained autonomy and reasonable freedom of action in domestic matters, the occupation authorities could best extend their influence and exert their pressure through individuals who lent themselves to German purposes either by outright activity or by acceptance of much of the German argument about the New Order. A list of such persons 1/ would include a few political figures such as Scavenius (who was pro-German but anti-Nazi), Gunnar Larsen, Thune Jacobsen, and Madsen-Mygdal, the old discredited leader of the Left; several business leaders like Th. Juncker and P. Bihessen; a sprinkling of landed magnates such as Count Bent Holstein or Count Knuth Knuthenborg; some intellectuals like Gudmund Hatt, Knud Berlin, Carl Roos, and the poet and author, Valdemar Rørdam; and a scattering of jurists such as E. Krenchel, E. Bruel, and Popp-Madsen, who helped work out the anti-Jewish legislation in 1943, and in 1944 made himself useful to the police authorities as a consultant on the "clearing murders."

German influence was extended also through the Dano-German societies of which there were several, headed in some cases by Danes, in others by Germans. Thus the head of the Danish German Society (Dansk Tysk Selskab) was Ernst J. Ipsen, a Danish traffic and tourist executive. A strong unit in Aarhus, Dansk Tysk Selskab i Aarhus, was headed by Thorkild Juncker, the margarine and oil cake manufacturer. The head of the Danish-German Union (Den Dansk Tyske Forening) was P. Knutzen of the Danish State Railways. The board of five members of this society included Professor Gudmund Hatt, the geopolitician

1/ See Ebbesen, Niels, (pseud.), Danmarks Ade efter 9 April (Stockholm, 1942), pp. 37-109.

Højberg Christensen, Minister for Education, Thune Jacobsen, Minister for Justice, and Ernst J. Ipsen of the Dansk Tysk Selskab. The Association for Danish Workers in Germany (Tysklandsarbejdernes Forening) was headed by Felix Lennholm, while Professor Otto Høfler, a German philogist, was in charge of the German Scientific Institute (Tyske Videnskabelige Institut), opened in February 1941. Branches of several purely German organizations were set up but apparently undertook no activities beyond the normal.

4. The Para-Military Formations

a. The Fricorps Danmark

Early in 1941 individual Danes were allowed to join the Regiment Nordland, a Waffen-SS formation. The Fricorps Danmark grew out of the concession, required by Scavenius in 1941, permitting Danish officers and men from seventeen to thirty-five who had performed their military service since 1931 to form a distinct Danish unit. The Fricorps members may have had Danish officers and many have worn Danish uniforms while training in Denmark, but when training continued in Germany they were given SS uniforms, with the word "Denmark" on the sleeve, and SS equipment; their pay and allowances were in German money. Their commander was Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Kyrssing, who, in his initial appeal for volunteers on 5 July 1941, announced that he had been given command of the Fricorps "with the Governments' approval," a phrase which was not disavowed by the Government but which probably took its point of departure from the concession Scavenius had secured. Kryssing, who soon fell from favor with the Germans was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Count F. von Schalburg. The Fricorps saw heavy service on the Lake Ilmen front in the spring of 1942. In a month two successive commanding officers, Schalburg and von Letow-Vorbeck, were killed in action. 1/

1/ In August 1944 Paul Neergaard, fatally injured in an automobile accident, was referred to as former chief of the Fricorps Danmark.

In September-October 1942 the Fricorps was sent home on furlough, and for weeks its members kept the life of the capital on edge. The Danish police had orders not to interfere, until one of the Fricorps men carelessly shot several women. The Fricorps was not ordered back to combatant duty abroad but late in the spring of 1943 it was said to be stationed in Germany. Its membership probably never exceeded a thousand and by February 1943 it must have been less than half that figure. SS and Fricorps recruiting officials in the spring of 1943 sought new volunteers but with little success, even Clausen's NSDAP giving it little publicity and not wishing to be associated with it. Any thoughts which Danish or German extremists may have entertained of using the Fricorps for police or military purposes within Denmark were dissipated by the disorders committed by the members on furlough in the autumn of 1942.

In October 1943 there were reports that all Danish volunteers, presumably including Fricorps had been brought together in a SS Panser Grenadierregiment Danmark said to be engaged in fighting Dalmatian partisans.

.b. The Schalburg Corps

The Schalburg Corps took its name from the commander of the Fricorps who fell on the Eastern Front on 2 June 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Schalburg was a member of the King's Royal Guard and fought not in the Waffen-SS uniform but in the green Guard uniform which King Christian had forbidden. For some reason it was decided by the Nazis to build Schalburg up as a national hero, a sort of Danish Horst Wessel. Great pomp surrounded his funeral in Copenhagen, which was attended by General Lüdke and von Renthe-Fink. Even Scavenius deposited a wreath on the grave of "a brave soldier, in the name of the Danish Government."

The build-up given to Schalburg's memory was capitalized in the autumn of 1943 when Captain Lieutenant P. Martinsen, back from the Eastern Front, organized the Schalburg Corps, "open to every honorable Dane" who wished to defend his country against "the Communist menace." The Corps, Martinsen assured Danes, would not mix in politics. There seems to have been some idea that when the Germans withdrew it might take over control and form the nucleus of a new Danish army. The Corps was organized in two branches, one active and one passive. Members of the active or military branch were issued uniforms, were given German military training and were promised they would be given police duties. The passive branch, also called People's Defense or National Guard (Folkevaern), was civilian in character. Women might be enrolled in it as a sort of Lotta service. The intention probably was to gather up in the civilian branch the remnants of Clausen's NSDAP party. The civilian branch was headed by Captain Paul Sommer, a former Danish Air Force lieutenant. The Corps claimed a membership of 6,000 or more, but the membership of the military division could hardly have exceeded 1,200.

Martinsen intended to endow the Corps with police functions. As the sabotage operations grew in number and intensity in 1943 the idea took hold that a weapon to meet it might be counter-sabotage. Gradually therefore a program of terror was elaborated in the Schalburg Corps involving attacks on persons and destruction of property designed to bring sabotage directed against the Wehrmacht into discredit. Sommer was directly in charge of the Corps anti-sabotage unit, which was put to use as a provocateur element by the Gestapo and other German extremists. In time the Corps was thoroughly discredited, and in the crisis of July 1944 one of the points yielded by the Germans was that the Schalburg Corps would be eliminated from

the Danish scene. For a number of weeks it appeared that this had been done, but in connection with the police emergency in September 1944 Schalburg elements apparently were drifting back to the Copenhagen scene, to help alleviate the police shortage which General Pancke had created.

E. GERMAN CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION

1. The Press

German control of the press in the "model protectorate," was of necessity mainly indirect. In such a situation the Germans made special efforts to exert pressure under cover in order to make it appear that the Danish press retained its pre-war tone. The Press Bureau of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Eskelund (who had been its head since August 1938), was chosen as cover for the censorship, which was operated from Berlin by way of the German Legation in Copenhagen, and more specifically through the German Press Attaché, Dr. Meissner and, later, through his successor Schroder. Only on very rare occasions in the early years did the Germans interfere directly in the affairs of the press. They consistently held to their formal policy of acting only behind the scenes. Less consistent were the formulations of directives to the Danish Press Bureau; consequently considerable confusion resulted, Danish journalists sometimes receiving, in the course of an afternoon, contradictory orders from the German Wehrmacht, the German Foreign Office, and the German Propaganda Ministry.

Some of these directives were reproduced in the illegal Danish press, and it has been possible from them to ascertain the main lines of German policy. The Germans were chiefly concerned with the handling of foreign political news, but the reporting of certain internal affairs, such as accounts of air raid damage, was also subject to censorship. Leading articles on internal developments were sometimes also submitted to the Press Bureau in advance by the papers concerned in order to avoid subsequent difficulties. There existed lists of authors who were banned from writing in the press. For foreign news the procedure was to telephone the material to the Press Bureau for the consideration of the officials there, who then might delete or change passages.

The negative character of the censorship was noticeable in the ban against any mention of a whole range of subjects. For instance, no comment was allowed on the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Denmark in 1941. No adverse comment was tolerated on the Danish workers in the Reich. All Norwegian news was severly curtailed and there could be no critical discussion of the Occupying Power.

The Germans had a strong hold on the supply of news since the Press Bureau was chiefly fed by the Axis-controlled DNB, Metropress, and STB, and papers could publish only telegrams with foreign news date-lined from Berlin, Tokio, and Rome, and Scandinavian news from Stockholm. During the first period after the occupation the Danish press correspondents in Stockholm succeeded in covering the whole world from the Swedish capital, where they had access to Allied reports. This practice, however, was stopped. No English reports seeped through after 1941, and the American telegrams were later barred. On the other hand, Swedish and Swiss papers were permitted in the country, after a ban had operated against them and all other neutral organs for some time following the 1940 invasion. Under the jurisdiction of Best, certain Swedish papers which had remained banned, such as Göteborgs Handels-och Sjofartstidning and Dagens Nyheter, were accessible again to Danish readers.

Contraventions against press regulations were dealt with by the Press Censorship Committee, (Besigtigelsenaevnet), of which various Danish editors were members. The Ministry of Justice, presumably under German pressure, interfered with the membership of this board on one occasion at the close of 1941, when the appointment of H.P. Sørenson, the editor of Social Demokraten, was cancelled and Niels Hasager, of Politiken, was appointed instead. Punishments generally consisted of fines and were rarely graver. In the spring

of 1941 the Social Democrat paper Demokraten of Aarhus was suspended for three days and one of its editors forced to resign.

Another office exercising censorship functions emerged late in the summer of 1944 in the form of a Press Office of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Denmark, really the office of Pancke.

On 25 April 1941, Dr. Meissner called together a number of Danish journalists at the Hotel d'Angleterre, the headquarters in Copenhagen of the occupying power, and issued a sharp warning against the failure of the Danish press to co-operate with the Germans. The conclusion of this speech, however, had a conciliatory ring:

> I will not again express any wish that the Press should adopt an attitude which will usefully link the destiny of Denmark with that of the Continent: but I will rather express my confidence that what I have said to you will induce you to leave behind you your inhibitions out of the past....

Meissner held another conference for the Danish press in July 1942. He started by forbidding any reporting of his speech, his words on the former occasion having been reproduced to his great indignation. This conference, too, was an attempt to win over the Danish press to the support of the New Order; its immediate occasion was probably the RAF raids over Denmark, which made it necessary to project the German official policy as regards the reporting of damage in Denmark.

The most sensational instance of German interference was the summons issued by General von Hanneken, Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces in Denmark, to the Danish press immediately after the Kolding incident on 27 February 1943, when a bomb was thrown at women telephone operators of the Wehrmacht. The representatives of the Danish press were ordered to appear at the military headquarters in

Copenhagen, where Hanneken, in the company of some German officers and of Meissner, read a declaration to the Danes on the subject of sabotage against the Wehrmacht. Hanneken said that he had often wondered why such matters were so little reflected in the press, and he now requested the press to assist in convincing their countrymen of the folly of such acts. As the Danish press was not gagged, it could contribute in a suitable way, but it must do so of its own accord. He insisted that the press must not, when dealing with the subject, give readers the impression that what it published was the result of his pressure.

The Danish press made a formal complaint to the Press Bureau that this summons by the Wehrmacht was a breach of the agreement with the Occupation Power, but it did not receive any satisfaction. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the meeting was the divergence in policy exposed between Dr. Meissner who had consistently banned all mention of sabotage in the Danish press. Shortly afterward a report stated that Meissner had volunteered for the Eastern Front and was leaving Denmark. His functions were taken over by Schroder, who put into practice Best's more conciliatory policy towards the press. In short, German policy may be characterized as vacillating. Until Meissner's first press conference it was marked by a cultivated friendliness; then followed an effort to be severe; and next came a conciliatory period.

After this incident cases of sabotage were mentioned in the newspapers, but further instructions, issued by the Reich through the Press Bureau on 19 April 1943, specified that all mention of sabotage in the press was to be treated as local news, in the same way as air raids or other war events. Later reports revealed that the increase in sabotage

had led the Germans to veto all mention of sabotage except where publicity would create ill-feeling aginst the saboteurs and so promote German interests. After the crisis of August 1943 the press was subjected to much closer supervision than before.

The Germans tried to have a representative on the staffs of the leading papers, but the newspaper staffs remained very loyal. Berlingske Tidende (a conservative paper) proved flexible and compromising in tone, and Social-Demokraten was cautious. Politiken (liberal) maintained a strong national line; so too did Nationaltidende (conservative), Børsen (a finance journal), and Kristeligt Dagblad (a religious publication), as well as such leading provincial papers as Aalborg Stiftstidende, Sorø Amtstidende, Vestkysten at Esbjerg, and Demokraten at Aarhus. Under German pressure the Press Censorship Committee imposed numerous fines and forced the dismissal of a number of editors, like Helwig Larsen from Kristeligt Dagblad, Sørensen from Social-Demokraten, and Blaedal from Berlingske Tidende.

After 1941 a lively underground press flourished. The Germans sponsored raids arresting editors and confiscating machines and equipment. In 1944 a number of printing and newspaper shops were raided and damaged, presumably by Schalburg elements. By August of that year the regimantation of the Danish press had become severe; pro-Nazi articles were syndicated and the obituary notices were so treated as to bring out clearly the identity of murder victims when they were sabotage guards in German service or members of the Nazi Party groups.

On the other ha nd, the Danish Nazi press flourished under German patronage. Meissner and Renthe Fink for a time assigned to Faedrelandet, the official publication of DNSAP, a monthly subvention of some fifty thousand kroner drawn

on the Danish National Bank. In the end, however, Faedrelandet proved its failure as a propaganda organ and fell into financial difficulties. It ceased to represent Clausen's party, and the editor, H. Henriksen, resigned in April 1943. National-Socialisten after enjoying a similar subvention of eight thousand kroner for a time, likewise closed down. Kritisk Ugerevue professed to be an independent weekly but it had the same publisher as Faedrelandet. Kamptegnet, drawing some eight thousand kroner a month from the same source as Faedrelandet, was an anti-Semitic organ which ended when the editors went to jail. In Slesvig the organ for the German minority was the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung, which remained the mouthpiece of provocative German minority leaders. The Danish branch of the Auslandsorganisation had an organ called Skagerrak, designed primarily for the Wehrmacht, though it circulated among civilians. Members of the Schleswigsche Kameradschaft were required to subscribe to the organ of the association, Schleswigsche Kameradschaft-Mann.

2. The Radio

Evidently the Germans hoped at the outset to exercise strong influence over the Danish radio. 1/ It is reported that before the invasion a German was trained to be ready to supervise the Danish radio. The Germans at first sent out some crude Nazi propaganda but the Danish service maintained a national policy, marred often, it is true, by misleading omissions. The Germans were not able to keep Jewish speakers off the air, and the Danish Nazis complained loudly of the boycott against themselves. On the other hand, the radio service occasionally had to yeild radio time to pro-Nazi speakers, as for example to a series by Professor Gudmund Hatt.

1/ The leading stations are Kalundborg (long wave) and Herstedvester, commonly called Copenhagen Radio (medium wave).

The Germans no doubt kept some watch on the programs, through Meissner and through the German Radio Attaché, Lohman. Apparently the occupation authorities made no effort to restrict the number of radios. 1/

After the August crisis in 1943 (see below 6) the Germans changed their lenient policy. In November German censors were installed in the Radio Building in Copenhagen and the Danish Broadcasting Council, managed by F.E. Jensen, was liquidated. In a letter to Jensen, Minister Best stated that henceforth Lohman would control all affairs of the Danish broadcasting service, including the choice of announcers and the formulation of programs. The news service was completely Nazified. A Danish announcer on the Hamburg radio, whom the Danish staff previously had refused to accept, was assigned to the German news service of the Danish radio. Lohman was to edit the radio newspaper, Pressens Radioavis, assisted by the Danish Nazis, Møller-Hansen Axel Hoyer, the head of Dansk Anti-Kommunisme. In March 1944 it was reported that a short-wave section was established in Radio House to interfere with BBC broadcasts for Danish listeners.

3. The Theater and the Moving Picture Industry

Business in the Danish theater continued good though performances often were interrupted by air-raid alerts. Plays were supervised by the office of the German Press Attaché, but there is no information on the method of censorship. A number of English and American plays were acted. Some of Kaj Munk's plays were performed, though his historical play on German-Danish relations in the fourteenth century, Niels Ebbesen, was banned. A play by the Danish pro-Nazi, Svend Borberg, also was acted, but in the main the repertoire

1/ Between 30 June 1943 and 30 June 1944 licensed radio receivers in Denmark increased from 973,551, to 1,013,045.

consisted of classical or non-political plays, without controversial interest. The Danish theater, on the whole, played for safety during the occupation, though certain bolder revues, directed at the Occupying Power, succeeded in getting past the censorship, and actors no doubt managed to put over a number of hits by departing from their lines. One particular cabaret, under Lulu Ziegler, used the revue as a medium of political satire and offended the Germans by ridiculing Reich institutions and personalities. It closed in November 1943, nominally on the ground of a shortage of actors.

The rules on film showings were not markedly changed by the occupation, though in January 1942 a ban was placed on showings of English and American films to take effect the following 1 July. Old films continued to be shown, however, until they were made illegal as of 1 January 1943. In spite of the restricted choice of films, the Danish boycotting of German films continued. A report on 17 May 1943 revealed that of the forty-eight main films then showing in Copenhagen, only two were entirely German, five others being German films played by Swedish actors. The German attempts to popularize the UFA news reel, as one of the most direct methods of winning over the Danes, failed. The Danes made a point of arriving at theaters late in order to miss the German news reels.

4. Church and School

The Danish Church in the main preserved its rights and privileges during the occupation. This was due to two chief factors; the Germans apparently deemed it wise not to interfere unduly in matters pertaining to the Church, and the Church, especially at the beginning of the occupation, took a rather passive attitude toward the invaders. It

seems, however, that the Church leaders later on realized that they had failed to give a clear lead to the nation and proceeded to adopt a more uncompromising attitude toward the oppressors. In the spring of 1943 all the Danish bishops signed a protest presented to the Minister of Justice, in which they attacked the current administration of justice, the illegal arrests, the anti-Semitic propaganda, etc. Conspicuous churchmen, such as Kaj Munk, were in the Danish opposition. One churchman, Reverend Anders Malling, undertook to promote Nazi ideas. So insignificant was the support given the New Order by Danish churchmen that an effort in the spring of 1944 to form a Danish Nazi Church Society apparently was sponsored only by laymen. 1/

The Danish schools were not subject to strict control. Attendance fell of somewhat in the elementary schools but increased on the secondary school level. The youth movements, YMCA and YWCA, were not interfered with. Their energies were combined in the Danish Youth Co-operative Movement, (Dansk Ungdomsamviike-Du) led by Hal Koch, and they became important sector of the Danish opposition movement. Danish youth found an outlet for its energies in growing agitation for post-war Scandinavian collaboration. 2/ Perhaps the emphasis on Scandinavian co-operation was not wholly unwelcome to the Germans.

1/ The national leader, a businessman named Norkjaer, was reported to be a former YMCA secretary.
2/ Represented by such organizations as Foreningen Norden, Dansk Nordisk Ungdomsforbund, and Det frie Nord.

F. GERMAN INFLUENCE IN DANISH ECONOMIC LIFE

1. German Objectives and Methods

The German policy of setting up Denmark as a "model protectorate" manifested itself very clearly in the methods of German economic control and influenced even the extent of the claims made on its agriculture and industry. The Germans did not assume direct control over Danish business but apart from special investigations conducted by German officials in Danish agencies confined themselves to presenting their requests through diplomatic channels and relied on Danish authorities to satisfy these demands. Only in a few branches, such as transportation, did the Germans constantly supervise the native authorities. By and large the Danes seem to have abided by the agreements reached between the German representatives and their own authorities, but, on the other hand, the Germans did not push their requests as far as in other occupied countries. The Danish standard of living was kept on a fairly high level, and German authorities refrained more or less from the indiscriminate confiscation of Danish property. The Germans, of course, extracted from Denmark as much in agricultural and industrial goods as was possible without reducing Danish standards of living below the German level and without applying more than indirect pressure. Industrial exploitation was relatively easy for the Germans inasmuch as virtually all raw materials had to be imported, mostly from Germany, and it was therefore simple to have Danish industry work for German account. The Germans paid conscientiously for everything they took, but the necessary funds for the local expenditures of German military organizations in the form of credits to the Reich. The Danish National Bank also made advances to Danish exporters to finance sales of merchandise to the Reich.

In the later period of occupation the shortage of raw materials in the Reich and transportation difficulties made it

impossible for the Germans to supply Danish industries adequately. This supply shortage, the increased sabotage activity, and wage disputes reduced Danish industrial production to a minimum. When they were no longer able to exploit Danish economic resources in a rational way, the Germans began to requisition food supplies and to resort to indiscriminate plundering. The Danish contribution to the German war effort was reduced to exports of agricultural produce and the use of Danish labor in erecting fortifications in Denmark or in work in Germany.

2. German Agencies Exercising Economic Control

Although Danish-German economic relations were handled formally through diplomatic channels, that is, through the German Minister in Denmark and periodic trade delegations, Denmark was fully integrated into the German-controlled sphere of continental Europe, and its economic exploitation for German account was directed from Berlin.

The economic sections of the German Legation and Consulate were in constant touch with the branches of Danish administration handling economic matters, as well as with Danish industry and trade organizations. They co-operated closely with the German military authorities in Denmark and the supreme Reich agencies in charge of economic controls. The German Army had liaison officers in the main branches of Danish administration, and representatives of German consular offices appeared often in Danish government agencies and conducted investigations. Permission for such investigation was demanded by the German Minister only if the Danish official objected. The German Minister was able for the most part to bring direct pressure to bear on every branch of the Danish economic life. The German diplomatic and consular service interfered and regulated industry, labor, and trade directly unless the Danish cabinet and Parliament decided to

make the question one of principle. In such cases the formal procedure of personal contact between the German Minister and Danish Foreign Minister was followed.

Danish industry, as far as it worked for German account, was controlled by the field office of the Speer Ministry, the War Economy Staff Denmark (Wehrwirtschaftsstab Dänemark). This agency acted as procurement office of the German Armed Forces for industrial products: it co-ordinated all German purchasing activities in industry and acted as the central order office (Zentralauftragstelle) to which all contracts had to be submitted for approval by the German buyers. It also assisted Danish manufacturers in securing fuel and other materials needed for German contracts and acted as regional control agency for steel allocation on behalf of the German steel control.

The German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark (Deutsche Handelskammer in Dänemark) represented private German business and acted as an information center.

3. Agriculture

Danish agriculture was cut off by the invasion from its overseas supplies of feed and was forced to rely on local resources. Livestock and dairy produce fell considerably until 1942, and large exports of cattle to Germany took place. At first, the Germans applied little pressure on the Danes to cut home consumption and so to keep exports on a high level. An exception was the rationing of sugar, by which Denmark became a sugar exporter. The Danish authorities estimated what quantities of various products would be available and, after deduction of domestic demands at liberal rates, the volume available for exportation was established. German requirements were considered first, and the amounts to be exported to Germany were specified in a trade agreement. Finally exports to other markets were negotiated. Danish needs of fertilizers were covered to

some extent by imports from Germany and Norway.

In addition to food exports to Germany the Danes were forced to supply the German troops stationed in Denmark with all necessary foodstuffs. The Danes succeeded in limiting the German military purchases to certain quantities established in mutual agreements. Organizations or members of the German Army, police, or other German agencies were prohibited from buying cattle, food, or any other produce without a special permit issued by the Quartermaster of the German Army in Denmark.

During the later period of the occupation, the Germans frequently complained at the slowness of deliveries and threatened (and in some instances carried out) confiscation of the requested goods. By requisitioning grains or potatoes, however, they reduced the Danish supplies of livestock feed, and they they were faced with a reduction of meat and butter imports from Denmark.

Danish farmers made large paper profits from sales to Germany and from domestic sales because prices for agricultural produce had increased considerably before price controls set up by the Danish Government became effective.

4. Food Rationing

The Germans left rationing and similar controls to Danish authorities. A comprehensive control of prices and supplies was undertaken in August 1940 and elaborated in November 1941. Administratively this was effected through several boards, mostly under the Ministry of Trade. The most notable of these boards were the Price Control Council (Priskontrolraadet), the Price Directorate (Prisdirektovatet), with price committees throughout the country, and the Directorate of Commodity Supplies. (See D 7.) By and large the Germans opposed rationing since Wehrmacht members could buy only in

the open market. This form of pillaging was circumvented with some success by the Danish boards through various rationings of production.

The rationing system was very much less comprehensive in Denmark than in other occupied countries. Milk, potatoes, fruit, and vegetables remained unrationed, and meat was rationed only locally. The official rationing system applied to grain, fats, and sugar. Manual workers were allowed extra rations of bread, groats, and fats.

5. Industry

Since with few exceptions Danish industries were dependent on German raw materials and fuel, they were forced to work for German account unless they chose to close down. The opening of two small steel mills made possible a certain production of iron goods for domestic needs. Cement was manufactured from domestic materials and used chiefly in the construction of fortifications. Shipbuilding, general engineering, and electrical plants used German steel and other metals working for German contracts. Textile goods were purchased by the Germans as long as stocks were available. Leather goods manufactured out of domestic hides, on the other hand, did not attract German buyers.

The exploitation of Danish industrial facilities depended on the extent to which the Germans were willing and able to supply fuels, raw materials, and other essential products. As a result of German shortages, Danish industrial production declined considerably after 1942, and the most important contribution of Danish industry consisted in the repair of German ships and the building of fortifications.

Industrial production for German account was organized and supervised by the War Economy Staff Denmark (Wehrwirtschaftsstab Dänemark) a field office of the Speer Ministry.

6. Fishing and Shipping

The Germans relied heavily on the Danish fishing industry for their needs of fish and supplied Rumanian oil to Danish fisherman on a rationed basis. The catch increased considerably and all of the exports went to Germany. Domestic sales were reduced slightly.

German control over Danish shipping was not rigid before 1943. The Danish State Cargo Department had considerable latitude in the management of the merchant fleet. Danish ships worked chiefly in Danish-German trade or in coastal traffic; a smaller number was engaged in purely German traffic. In January 1943, however, Germany forced the Danish Government to cede her several ships.

7. Communications

Very few changes were made in communication agencies, which continued to be serviced by Danish personnel under the new Ministry of Communications (Trafikministeriet), set up in November 1942. No official announcement was made, but censorship was evidently established at the outset over both domestic and foreign telegrams. In the spring of 1943 correspondence between Jutland and Copenhagen was placed under censorship to reduce the transmission of underground papers. Wire tapping was common.

The Danish state railroads, headed by P. Knutzen, well known for his pro-German sympathies,1/ maintained autonomy in their operations, they were required, of course, to adjust themselves to German traffic needs and to give them priority treatment. There was, however, no clear-cut requisitioning of Danish locomotives or of rolling stock.

1/ Knutzen long was chairman of the Danish German Association. He was said to have resigned after the crisis of August 1943. However, in 1944 he was still urging his railway employees to show their German colleagues proper respect.

The Germans exercised control through liaison officers attached to the headquarters of the railroads and to the principle stations and junctions.

8. Foreign Trade

The Germans did not assume control over Danish foreign trade through agencies of their own, but they supervised Danish trade negotiations with other countries and secured for themselves the bulk of Danish exports in periodic negotiations between German and Danish delegations. Although the German delegation had a very strong position in such dealings, the Danes were for the most part able to protect their interests within the limits permitted by the German policy of not exploiting the country indiscriminately. The chief German figure in trade relations was Dr. Walther, whose influence was apt to be cast against the Nazi Party extremists in favor of policies permitting regularity of economic deliveries.

Control over Danish trade was in the hands of the Directorate of Commodity Supplies (Directorat for Vatesorgyning), established in pre-war days to control exports and imports and foreign exchange operations. It was effective in advising the authorities and in correlating the various branches of the Danish economy in such a way as to ensure equitable distribution in the face of German demands for particular lines of export. Danish export surplus of food products, which went largely to England before the war, was diverted to Germany. To prevent German purchases of industrial products from dislocating the Danish market, a committee was formed early in 1941 which represented trade and industrial groups and labor unions and served as intermediary in the negotiations with the Germans. Prices for deliveries to the Germans were also controlled.

Danish trade with countries other than Germany was organized so that imports and exports balanced and rates of exchange were stable. In some cases even prices of exported goods were fixed. Balanced trade was provided by trade agreements made for a fixed period, usually of six or twelve months, each country undertaking to deliver to the other an agreed quantity of goods during the period. Agreements of this kind were concluded although they were not all successfully carried out, with Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Roumania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. As an exception, the reciprocal trade was supplemented and balanced by trade with a third nation; for example, some Danish imports from Sweden were paid for by exports to Finland on Swedish account.

This international barter, which under German domination replaced foreign trade, did not assume proportions comparable to the pre-war exchange of goods.

Notwithstanding the large exports to Germany, Danish trade decreased in value and, because of the higher prices, even in volume. Germany delivered to Denmark mainly fuels and industrial raw materials needed for production on German account; Danish exports to Germany consisted of foodstuffs and industrial products. Germany's deliveries were much lower than her purchases. The resulting Danish claims were not settled by Germany but carried forward in the Danish-German clearing account, which steadily increased until it reached 2.5 billion Danish crowns in November 1944. Danish exporters however received payment for their claims from the Danish National Bank, which was forced to advance the necessary funds.

9. Financial Controls

a. Exchange Rate

The official value of 1 Danish kroner in reichsmarks was altered in April 1940 from 1 Kr. = 0.48 RM. to 1 Kr. = 0.50 RM. in order to facilitate conversion of German money by military authorities as well as the use of German military currency (Reichskreditkassenscheine) then issued. Shortly afterward the previous rate was re-established and the German currency withdrawn.

As in all occupied countries Danish prices were much lower than German prices, compared at the official exchange rate. German purchases were favored in this respect, but the total volume of these purchases was limited by the over-all Danish supply capacity rather than by price considerations. Nevertheless, Danish authorities, in agreement with the Germans, decided to increase the rate of the Danish currency in order to offset at least partially the price disparity. In January 1942, the value of 1 Kr. was increased to equal 0.52 RM. The exchange value of 1 US dollar was thus reduced from 5.18 Kr. (pre-war value) to 4.79 Kr. (new nominal rate).

A special rate of 1 RM. = 1 Kr. was used by Danish tax authorities in computing the income of Danish workers in Germany as far as it was spent in the Reich, whereas for income transferred into Denmark the worker had to pay income tax at the rate of 1 RM. = 1.92 Kr. This was supposed to be an incentive to Danish workers to spend more of their income in Germany and to reduce their remittances home.

b. Danish-German Clearing Arrangements

By establishing the German Clearing Office (Deutsche Verrechnungskasse) in Berlin, the Germans tried to make the reichsmark a means of international payments. All occupied nations were forced to agree to trading with Germany and with

most of the other occupied countries through the Berlin Clearing Office. Germany, however, considered it an obligation of the occupied countries to supply her with more goods than they received in return, which of course upset the clearing and resulted in steadily growing claims of the other nations against the Reich, claims which were booked by the German Clearing Office. In pre-war clearing agreements no provision had been made for the exporters of one country to obtain payment before the other partner had delivered goods for the same value; in this way a balance was achieved by the application of regular business principles to foreign trade. The Germans, however, forced their trade partners (except the neutral countries) to advance the value of merchandise exported to Germany to their exporters and thus converted the clearing account into a financing instrument. The clearing became one of the chief methods for the economic exploitation of Denmark as for that of most other occupied nations; it was second in importance only to the "advances" of the Danish National Bank, which was the Danish equivalent of the outright occupation payments levied from other nation.

c. The Financing German Expenditures in Denmark

As in other occupied countries, after occupation of Denmark the German military authorities issued occupation currency (Reichskreditkassenscheine) to pay for local expenses of troops. Within a short time, however, the Danish National Bank assumed the obligation to supply the German authorities with all the local currency they would need. The Germans then refrained from issuing further occupation currency, and withdrew the Reichskreditkassenscheine from circulation. The payments for account of the Germans or directly to the Germans were booked by the Danish National Bank as "advances", but there is no evidence that an agreement had been reached as to the

repayment of these advances or their funding in any other way by the Danish state or the German Reich. A detailed accounting is available for the items on the Danish National Bank's sundry debtors' (Wehrmacht) account, 1 October 1944:

	Millions of Danish kroner
Paid in cash to German authorities	1,715
Paid to Danish contractors	1,638
Paid for purchases of foodstuffs and construction of barracks	135
Paid to the State Railways for transportation of passengers and goods	158
Paid to municipalities for gas, light, rent, etc.	58
Paid to hotels and similar items	57
Paid in compensation of confiscated property	40
Total	3,801

d. Banking

The Danish National Bank financed all Danish contributions to Germany by advancing to the German Army the funds needed for local payments, and by advancing for account of the German Clearing Office the funds needed for payment of Danish exports into Germany. Until the end of November 1944, advances to the Wehrmacht amounted to 4,154 million kroner and the the financing of clearing claims to 2,732 million kroner, to make a total of 6,886 million kroner.

As a result of these payments the Danish note circulation expanded considerably and exercised an inflationary pressure on the price level. The Danish Government tried to compensate these tendencies by various measures, especially by increasing cash reserve requirements for bank deposits and by issuing government bonds the proceeds of which were deposited in blocked account with the National Bank. To a certain extent these efforts were successful, and currency circulation increased much less than would correspond to the

amount of central bank credit used to finance the German expenditures. From 30 March 1940 until 30 November 1944 the note circulation increased by 1,015 million kroner (from 609 to 1,621 million kroner), private deposits with the National Bank by nearly 3,000 million kroner, and government deposits by over 2,000 million kroner.

The Danish National Bank, as well as the Danish Government, had thus adopted credit policies which were in line with German ideas; they currently financed all German expenses and engaged in measures combatting inflation, which would have made German operations difficult. There was no need, therefore, for the German authorities to exercise any control over Danish banks.

e. Public Finance

Financial policies of the Danish state were also regulated by negotiation between the Danes and the Germans Direct control was not exercised on Danish finances. The Danish budget was not affected by the payments exacted by the Germans because the Danish National Bank advanced all the necessary funds. The ordinary budget of the Danish state showed during the war, therefore, a surplus of revenues used to reduce the state debt. At the same time, however, the Danish state issued special government bonds to reduce the money plethora resulting from the inflationary financing of German purchases. The proceeds of these bonds were deposited in a blocked account with the National Bank. The liquidation of these bonds and the funding of the advances made by the Danish National Bank to the German Army and the German Clearing Office will constitute a postwar financial problem for the Danish state, to some extent identical with the problem resulting from the expansion of Danish money circulation in the form of currency and deposits.

10. Labor

There was considerable unemployment in Denmark, especially during the first two years, of the occupation. Various schemes for reducing unemployment were undertaken, but these were all the concern of the local Danish authorities who sought to keep as intact as possible the well established pre-war position of Danish labor. The German authorities influenced the situation through their generous offers of opportunities for employment. By 1942 some twenty-five to thirty thousand Danes were working directly for the Wehrmacht in Denmark, mostly on fortifications in Jutland.

It appeared that there was no scheme for the direct compulsory recruitment of workers for Germany, and labor mobilization was never applied in Denmark. But shortly after the occupation, pressure evidently was applied on the Danish authorities in the form of threats to interfere with coal and coke supplies to Denmark unless five thousand Danish workers were sent to German construction industries. The first contingent left in June 1940. Six-month contracts were the rule, with some running to twelve, but most foreign labor was in Germany for the duration. By March 1943 it was reported that 101,000 men and 11,000 women had entered Germany from Denmark to work.1/ The maximum number in Germany at any one time (1942) could hardly have exceeded 45,000. Berlin labor statistics gave the number as approximately 22,500 in Germany at the end of 1943, of which some 4,400 were women. In addition from seven to nine thousand Danes went to Norway to work for the Germans, chiefly in the Trondheim area, and eighty truck farmers went to Finland in 1942.

The Danish authorities took a non-committal attitude regarding these foreign enlistments, merely requiring those leaving the country to make the appropriate arrangements with

the State Emigration Office (Statens Udvandringskontor). Remittances sent home by the workers in Germany were handled through payments made in Denmark by the Dansk Landmandsbank. Welfare activities for these workers were undertaken and their interests looked after in various ways. A transit camp was set up at Flensborg. Two papers in Danish were launched; Broen, a weekly, and Horizonten, a fortnightly. An Association for Danish Workers in Germany was started, and entertainment was provided by the Kraft durch Freude organization. An association of Danish Workers Abroad was started in Denmark in 1942. The liaison official between the German Labor Front and the Danish workers in Germany was Felix Lennholm.

1/ Those who returned for vacations were counted twice.

G. THE CRISIS OF AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1943 AND THE MILITARY OF EMERGENCY

1. Events Leading to the Crisis

The summer of 1943 witnessed a great increase in sabotage, influenced, perhaps, by confidence over the outcome of the national elections in March, by the growing Allied air offensive against German cities, the increased load on Danish communications after Sweden on 15 August abolished German transit privileges, and above all, by improved sabotage organization. In reaction to the intensified resistance, German policy was to undergo a definite shift in the direction of severity and increased control. There is some indication that this shift was encouraged if not precipitated by General von Hanneken, who had for some time been irritated by the politically cautious policy of Dr. Best, a checkmate to Hanneken's authority in Denmark as well as to the sharpening of military rigor.

On 4 August the Trade Attaché, Dr. Krüger, in a communication to the Danish Foreign Minister, demanded German jurisdiction over Danish saboteurs, involving their trial according to German law in German courts and the serving of prison sentences in Hamburg. After refusing this the Danish Government, in a public statement on 21 August, sought to allay the tension by saying that in the very nature of the situation the occupation must give rise to some friction. In the second half of August sabotage and strike disorders spread widely, especially on Jutland; on 27 August the German Minister, Best, just returned from conferences at Berlin, presented to the Scavenius government an ultimatum which was promptly rejected. As made public by the Germans, the ultimatum had demanded that the Danish Government on its own authority, declare a state of emergency and take the necessary steps

to ensure order, especially severe censorship, that it impose a heavy fine on the city of Odense, and that it institute the death penalty for sabotage, and that all Danes, both the armed forces and private citizens surrender their fire arms and ammunition. According to the German announcement, the Danish Government had stated that it was not in a position to carry out this task, and the German Government therefore was compelled to "entrust it" to the Commander in Chief of the German troops. On 29 August the Scavenius government, that is the entire body of Ministers, resigned.

2. The Proclamation of a Military State of Emergency

On 29 August General von Hanneken, through Ritzaus Bureau and the Kalundborg Radio, proclaimed a state of military emergency, basing his action on paragraphs 42 to 56 of the Hague rules on land warfare. The German Army took control of various localities in Denmark. At the same time the German Military Commander assumed control of the administration of the country and made an appeal to the different agencies of government to continue work, under the threat of penalties for strikes. All gatherings of more than five people, save religious gatherings, were forbidden. A strict curfew was imposed. Postal, telegraph, and telephone services were temporily suspended. Strikes were prohibited, and the military authorities threatened to punish provocation to strike, "as a rule" with death. Armed force was to be ruthlessly used against crowds, and German military courts were to deal with violators of the decrees.

General von Hanneken made other dispositions which encouraged a state of near-revolt. He ordered German soldiers to "protect" the Royal Family and to restrict movements of the Cabinet members. He ordered widespread political arrests.

On 29 August, the Germans struck at the Danish Navy and Army. Vice Admiral Wedel ordered the fleet to "escape to Sweden or scuttle the ships." Every vessel was either scuttled or damaged, or escaped to Sweden. The Army refused to capitulate and there was spirited resistance at several points; it was reported that the Germans had to employ dive bombers, tanks, and guns to quell the resistance. There were fairly heavy casualties.

On 30 August the Germans ordered all members of the armed forces to report to the nearest German headquarters and give themselves up. Most of them seem to have complied. By the end of September about six thousand had been interned. Several hundred escaped to Sweden and some went underground. The Germans seized the garrisons and stores of the Danish forces. In many cases the Danes, anticipating the coup, had spirited rifles and ammunition away and, had blown up stores. General von Hanneken issued a decree demanding that all military and private arms and ammunition be surrendered by 7 September; failure to comply would be subject to the death penalty. The wearing of the Danish uniform was prohibited. On 5 September the death penalty was prescribed for aiding agents of the opposition by active sympathy or by passive behavior. Death or long imprisonment was decreed also for those who had been or were trying to betray German state secrets, who aided any enemy of Germany, or who favored the enemy, as well as those who had reliable knowledge of the intention to commit any of the above crimes without informing the German authorities.

In mid-September it was ordered that all material belonging to the Danish Army should be delivered to the nearest German military authority by 1 October. Ignoring a protest from the head of the Copenhagen government to the effect that collective fines could not be imposed under The Hague Convention,

General von Hanneken fined the city of Odense one million kroner as compensation for the shooting of a German soldier, and Copenhagen one and one-half million kroner for attacks on two German soldiers. He went further in a decree of 8 September empowering the German Army to confiscate buildings and land with fixtures and movables. No legal proceedings could be taken and the German authorities had the right to confiscate buildings and land with fixtures and movables. No legal proceedings could be taken and the German authorities had the right to carry out necessary reconstructions, though the right of private property was assured. By a decree of the following day all Danish industrial and commercial concerns, including retailers, were required without delay and to the limit of their capacity to accept employment for, or make deliveries to, the German Army in Denmark and its satellite organizations, such as the Organisation Todt and the Rüstungsstab Dänemark.

3. Administrative Readjustments in the Danish Government

The crisis of 29 August had been precipitated by von Hanneken in the interest of the Wehrmacht. He and his advisers may have expected to repeat the crisis of November 1942, when German pressure brought in a new ministry, more favorable to the Germans than its predecessor. (See C 3.) But the crisis of 1942 was not repeated. Instead, in forcing the resignation of Scavenius and his Ministers, Hanneken's state of military emergency created a political void in Danish public life. Scavenius and his Ministers promptly resigned. The King, under "house arrest," considered himself a prisoner of war (though the guard at his palace was withdrawn on 6 October), without authority to exercise his executive and legislative authority through a Cabinet. The presiding board of the Rigsdag decided that the parliament could not assemble for the regular session on the first Tuesday in October, since it could be called into session only by the King or the Cabinet. The moves against the military officers and the equipment of the armed

forces made it clear to everyone that the modus vivendi between Germany and Denmark based upon the German declaration of 9 April 1940 was over.

The political vacuum which Hanneken's moves created had to be dealt with by Best. On the whole Best's influence for a time increased (and with it also the influence of the Party extremists). There were some indications that in mid-September Best made a move to get a new Danish ministry. He was reported to have made the following proposals on 13 September to the Department Chief of the Foreign Affairs Ministry: (1) that the judicial and police powers assumed by the Germans under the emergency should be left with them and that they should have complete control of the press and the radio; (2) that since Danish forces were disarmed the Ministry of Defense should be dissolved; (3) that the Rigsdag should meet to empower the Government to make laws and then be dissolved. These proposals were rejected by the Committee of Nine. (See C 4.)

After August 1943 the administration of government affairs was in the hands of the chiefs of the government departments. They were the officials next below the ministers in each branch of the government. On 29 August 1943 they were urged by the King, the Cabinet, and the Rigsdag, and also by General von Hanneken, to continue their work. In this role they were referred to as "the Danish Administration." All told there were nineteen of them, as heads of several administrative agencies, such as the State Railways and Ports and Telegraph, were included.1/

These administrative chiefs continued to carry on the daily routine of administration. They took the attitude that the appeal of the King, the Cabinet, and the Rigsdag

1/ Lovitende, A. 1942, 12 November, p. 1709.

on 29 August gave them power of attorney in handling administrative problems. They continued to issue announcements, circulars, and communications on behalf of the Government. Each chief took full responsibility within his department or agency. The question of their power of legislation was left open, the chiefs taking the attitude that legislation of a political nature was beyond their competence. Through negotiations with the Supreme Court it was agreed that laws which were absolutely necessary, and which were issued by the chiefs in the form of legal regulations, would be allowed to stand.

Some of their actions appeared conciliatory, but in the main they stood their ground in the face of German pressure. The Justice Department took responsibility for a law amendment -- one giving Danish women married to members of the Wehrmacht both Danish and German citizenship. But the chiefs fought off German efforts to induce the Danish police to do sabotage guard duty, though on one occasion they agreed to expand patrol activity and to set up two additional police stations in Copenhagen. To discourage the ruthless cutting of forests in Jutland, the department chiefs appointed a forester at Beller to check on the Germans. The department chiefs fought off German demands that the provincial governor at Vejle be given dictational powers. At times the pressure was severe, as in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was forced to release to the Danish press a German denial concerning the hostage aspect of the execution of eleven Danish patriots. In some cases the department chiefs definitely rejected German demands, as in the issue of November 1943 over the degree of power to be assigned to P. Herschend, provincial governor with charge over the strategic Jutland and Fyn areas. While the

administrative heads assigned to Herschend special functions for these areas, they refused, as the Germans urged, to endow him with dictatorial powers, on the ground that they had no authority to grant such broad authority.

The administrative chiefs assembled for discussions, which were held regularly. But they took particular care not to form a corporate body which could be subjected collectively to German pressure and which would have suggested a more permanent innovation than they wished to effect. In general the Danish people approved the continued functioning of the government departments because they feared that otherwise the Germans might assume complete control, and also because the administrative chiefs served to curtail German demands on numerous occasions.

The German authorities disliked the role of the administrative chiefs but could think of no better arrangement that would be practicable. Thus, even through the crises that were to arise in 1944, the Germans retained these Danish functionaries rather than assume the tremendous burden of supervising directly the entire Danish administration.

4. The End of the State of Military Emergency

Though no progress had been made in resolving the constitutional difficulty created by the resignation of the Scavenius government, the state of military emergency was lifted on 6 October 1943. Significantly, the lifting was announced by Best, not by Hanneken who had proclaimed it. Best proclaimed, however, that certain of the regulations issued by the German Commander in Chief would remain in force:

1. The regulations prohibiting strikes and meetings, as given in the announcement of the state of emergency.

2. The order of 4 September 1943 regarding the requisitioning of buildings and property.

3. The order of 4 September 1943 concerning deliveries to and work for the German Army in Denmark by Danish firms.

4. The order of 3 September 1943 prohibiting the wearing of Danish military uniforms in public.

5. The order of 16 September 1943 calling for the handing over of Danish military material.1/

Dr. Best, and even the military authorities, sought to restore the status quo, the disturbance of which they evidently realized by this time to have been a mistake. The retirement of the Wehrmachtfrom the control of civil affairs was furthered by General von Hanneken's shift of his headquarters from Copenhagen to Jutland and his settling finally at Silkeborg.

By the spring of 1944 however, increasing sabotage and invasion jitters forced the German Army to act again. In April and May widespread arrests were followed by several executions. On 23 June eight Danes under death sentence were executed as hostages for a daring sabotage action the day before at the Danish arms manufacturing plant (Rekylsyndikatet). The same day a state of martial law was proclaimed for the whole island of Sjaelland, affecting especially Copenhagen. A general strike spread to the provincial towns; in the ensuing disorders over ninety persons were killed in Copenhagen. On 1 July the Danish Freedom Council took up the cause and presented the Germans with a series of demands, including the eliminations of the Schalburg Corps from the streets of Copenhagen. The German authorities, in successive concessions, by 5 July yielded to the chief Danish demands. On 5 July the German authorities informed the chief of the Danish police that members of the SS and the Schalburg Corps were no longer entitled to carry

1/ News Digest, #1258, 7 October 1943.

out independent actions such as arrests and house searches. The German retreat seems to have been motivated by the influence of Dr. Walther, head of the German trade delegation, who was alarmed by the effect of the Danish strikes upon the production of German war materials.

As will be seen, however, the trend towards a more stringent policy, as represented in the state of military emergency and in subsequent actions of the German Army in Denmark, was interrupted only temporarily. The period of the "model protectorate" was definitely ended in the fall of 1944. Even Dr. Best, seeing that Berlin was no longer content with half-measures, thenceforth tended to adopt or at least to acquiesce in the viewpoint of the extremists. This was that Danish resistance must be stamped out in the interests of German war production and security. The only question was as to whether the Danish police could be utilized as the instruments of suppression and, if not, as to whether the Wehrmacht or the German police should be chiefly responsible for the execution of a more rigorous German policy in Denmark.

H. THE CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1944 AND INCREASED GERMAN POLICE CONTROL

The course of the German occupation of Denmark was marked by several shifts in the center of practical authority as among the several organs of German control--Wehrmacht, Legation, and police. After the few days of combat the principal responsibility for the interests of the occupation seems to have passed to the Legation and the Minister Plenipotentiary, who was responsible both to the German Foreign Minister and to Hitler (as the latter's special deputy). But, as has been seen above (G), the crisis of August 1943 brought with it a resurgence of the responsibility of the Wehrmacht, by virtue of the declaration of a military state of emergency and issued decrees of broad scope in relation to civilian life. After the summer of 1944, however, preponderance of practical authority tended to pass more and more to the Nazi Party--not, indeed, as represented in the Legation, but rather as represented in the German SS and police, headed by Pancke. While the SS and police had played an important role in occupied Europe in general, the development in Denmark was distinctive insofar as the Chief of Police there enjoyed, for a time at least, an authority that transcended the power of other organs of German military government. There was, indeed, no change in the theory underlying German military government in Denmark, which continued to assign the Wehrmacht and the Legation co-cordinate and separate responsibilities. But in effect power was shifted away from the military and towards an element in the civilian authority which was no longer subjected to the Legation but to Himmler and the SS in Berlin.

1. The Controversy between the German and the Danish Police

The unwillingness of the Danish police to participate

in measures of the Germans against Danish patriots had helped to precipitate the crisis of August 1943 and was reflected in the action taken against them in that month by the German military authorities. In the last days of August the Danish police were disarmed together with the Danish Army and Navy, though within a few days their arms and authority were largely restored. In September 1943 the Police Administration presented to the Danish Ministry of Justice a declaration which indicated the principal point on which the Danish police were to insist in the ensuing controversies with the Germans: that Danish police, in accordance with the Hague Convention provisions on military occupation, should not be ordered to participate in the German arrests, raids, and other measures directed against the Danish resistance movement.

After the lifting of the state of military emergency in October, the German authorities, especially the military, sought to restore the status quo, while the Party extremists, notably the Gestapo, interfered more and more in Danish police and judicial matters. Indeed, they even intervened to apply to Denmark the Nazi anti-Semitic policy, which the moderates had long opposed as unfeasible in Denmark. A decree of 29 October ordered the rounding up of Danish Jews-- a measure to which the Wehrmacht in general was either indifferent or opposed. The Gestapo raided the Jewish centers while the Danish police themselves lent no aid. It was reported that, because of the unpopularity in Denmark of the anti-Semitic measures, Kannstein, head of the German police in Denmark, went to Berlin to protest the anti-Jewish raids. In any case Kannstein was recalled about this time and was succeeded by SS General Günther Pancke, who was to pursue an unfaltering and energetic policy in establishing the control of the German police in Denmark.

The fall and winter months of 1943 witnessed increasing German use in police matters of the newly founded and ruthless Schalburg Corps (see above D4,b), of which many Danish criminals were members. The Schalburg Corps proved willing auxiliaries to the Germans in guarding Danish communication lines and ports to intercept Jews seeking to flee from Denmark to Sweden. This Corps, hated by the Danish people, also served the Germans in their fight against the renewed wave of Danish sabotage. Members of the Corps perpetrated acts of counter-sabotage against Danish property or revenged the murders of Danish Nazis by so-called "clearing murders." In a vicious circle, these acts of the Schalburg Corps only increased the resistance of the Danish activists.

Throughout the fall of 1943 the German authorities made demands upon the Danish police to take a more active part in the repression of Danish sabotage, but the Police Administration persisted in their intransigence and even protested against German arrests and trials of Danish citizens. The negotiations between the German and Danish authorities culminated in a Danish proposal to the Germans on 4 January 1944, The Danish Police Administration proposed a demarcation of spheres between the Danish and German police which would have kept in Danish hands saboteurs against property in which German interests were not involved, even though under German guard, Danish police were to make arrests and to turn over those apprehended to Danish jurisdiction, under which they were to remain. The proposed agreement also provided that the search for and arrest of parachute agents or foreign or Danish military bodies should not be undertaken by the Danish police, although information lodged by the population concerning such individuals or groups with the police was to be handed on to the Wehrmacht. The Germans rejected the proposal and demanded that the Danish

police share in the investigation of all sabotage cases, that Danish saboteurs arrested by the Danish police be turned over to the Germans, and that some of the highest Danish police officials be changed. The Danish police authorities in turn rejected these demands.

On certain issues, however, agreement was reached between the Danish and German authorities in the early part of 1944. Clashes involving both Danes and Germans were to be handled by joint patrols of German and Danish police, obviating the necessity of the latter waiting for the former before intervening in a clash. Two such joint patrols were established. Further, on 11 January 1944 an agreement was reached whereby Danish policemen in certain cases were authorized to arrest members of the German Army of Occupation and individuals employed by the Germans. Such authorization of arrest applied only to persons caught red-handed in the perpetration of a serious crime; in less serious cases Danish police were entitled to establish the identity of the German in question. Other provisions mentioned types of German personnel whom Danish policemen could not arrest, stipulated that in no case could an arrest be made by them when certain German authorities were present, and specified that arrested Germans should as soon as possible be handed over to the German authorities. Despite such qualifications, the agreement was notable for the degree of authority which it gave to the native police of an occupied country and indicated the great value which the Germans attached to continued Danish collaboration. The Germans made another concession in March 1944, after Danish protest at the failure of the Germans to give information about arrests and deportations of Danes. It was provided that the Danish police might appoint two liaison officers to the Gestapo who would as far as possible follow the cases of Danes who had been arrested.

On the other hand, in general the relations between the German and the Danish police deteriorated because of the continuing sabotage and the fact that on fundamental issues the divergencies in regard to jurisdiction had not been resolved. The Germans demanded surrender to them of Danish saboteurs--even of those who had violated only Danish property Moreover, the German authorities in increasing degree kept all saboteurs captured by them and let them be tried before German courts. As the spring of 1944 wore on the Germans increased their encroachments. Thus the radio on 24 March announced that the duties of the Copenhagen marine police would be taken over by the German marine police. On the other hand, the German authorities sought to add to the unwelcome duties of the Danish police by demanding that they take over all guard duties, including sabotage demand. As it was against Danish policy to assume duties directly instrumental to German military interests, the Ministry of Justice refused this demand.

The German oplice forces intensified their activities after the invasion in France, and particularly after the attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944. Arrests and raids were almost daily experiences. It was after July 1944 that the office of Police Chief Pancke first appeared to be assuming a broader jurisdiction relatively to other German organs of authority: news releases on German demands upon the Danish civil population began to be issued from Pancke's office and in the name of the SS and Police General in Denmark.

2. The Declaration of a Police State of Emergency

A crisis in the relations between the German and the Danish authorities was portended by several warnings which the Germans issued. As early as April 1944 Dr. Best, on the occasion of introducing the shooting of hostages, addressed a violent accusation against the Danish police for not having

taken a sufficiently active part in combating sabotage. The last warning that the "passivity" of the Danish police would no longer be tolerated came from the Supreme SS and Police Command, that is , from Pancke's office. The Germans had been very reluctant to take over full police duty in Denmark, if only because of the enormity of the task and the demands which it would have entailed upon their personnel. Apparently the prospect of Allied invasion (Best's headquarters were moved from Copenhagen to South Jutland in September) and the possibility of Danish patriots lending aid stimulated extreme Party elements to consider the advantages of a firmer control over the civil population. This disposition was solidified by the agitation among Danes that arose in the middle of September over the deportation to Germany, despite promises to the contrary, if a number of prisoners from the Frøslev concentration camp, as well as by the killing of a number of Danes in Raadhuspladsen, Copenhagen. A strike wave took place in South Jutland on 15 September, followed by a forty-eight hour general strike in Copenhagen from the 16th to the 18th. The German authorities first showed their exasperation by occupying the Royal Castle at Amalienborg. On 19 September Police General Pancke proceeded to the extreme measure of declaring a police state of emergency.

Just before the declaration of the emergency an announcement from Pancke's headquarters over the Kalundborg radio attacked the shortcomings, as the Germans saw them, of the Danish police, They had not only failed to combat sabotage and the "illegal murders," but, the German authorities alleged, had even abetted them. Further, it was charged that the Danish police had not moved against general strikes and had done nothing to counteract the "Bolshevization" of the population. Therefore, it was stated, the occupying power, "fighting for its life in the gravest hour of the war,"

was forced to take steps to maintain law and order the country and would proceed to reorganize the Danish police.

Reorganization would however, be preceded by the suspension of Danish police functions. Point three of Pancke's proclamation of 19 September 1944 read: "Until the reorganization of the Danish police has taken place, the maintenance of law and order is assumed by the German occupation power." The proclamation decreed the dissolution not only of the Danish police force but also of the Civil Air Defense organizations. Illegal possession of weapons would be punished by shooting on the spot. The death penalty would be imposed upon anyone acting in such a manner as to delay the restoration of law and order. It was, indeed, promised that the intervention undertaken would be rescinded as soon as normal security conditions were restored. But the Danish policemen were immediately arrested, and in the next few days upwards of 1,700 Copenhagen policemen were deported to Germany, later deportations bringing the figure of police deportees nearer to 3,000. This measure greatly aroused Danish public opinion, and there was continued agitation for their return to Denmark, together with an intensification of sabotage. To propitiate Danish sentiments the Germans returned numerous Danish policemen, but continued to keep them in detention.

In a decree of 21 September Pancke sought to solve the immediate problems of maintaining order by inviting the municipal and local authorities to form under their respective jurisdictions a local order police and a local criminal and emergency police to carry out the functions of the dissolved Danish police. The Danish Ministry of Justice encouraged the formation of such local Guard Defense (Vagtvaern) units. The Vagtvaern were organized as agencies of the municipal

bodies rather than of the central authority. Maintenance of the law became an impromptu affair: even the administration of justice in some cases became voluntary. The Danish Administration was influenced by its desire to prevent conditions of crime and disorder which would give the Germans a pretext for further intervention and for taking all administration of justice out of Danish hands. Danish citizens in general were put on their mettle to make law observance a special concern; as they saw it, in the lapse of the state's power to keep order, the citizen had the responsibility of seeing that it was maintained lest Danish society disintegrate.

3. The Increase in the Power of the German SS and Police Chief

The effect of the declaration of police emergency and of the measures by which it was implemented was to give the office of the SS and Police Chief not only control over all Danish life but also the practical preponderance of power among the organs of German authority. The German police themselves took over the decisive police functions. They were greatly expanded in numbers by the military police who were sent from Berlin; in addition they again used the Schalburg elements as auxiliaries. The Gestapo was the most active branch of the German police, taking over the work of the Danish criminal police who were interned.

The state of police emergency was declared by Pancke to be lifted asof 15 October, but this formal action did not mean a lessening of the activity of the German police. The Danish policemen continued to be interned and the German police force proceeded to establish systematically their jurisdiction. Denmark was divided into four SS- und Polizeibereichstellen (SS and Police Administrative Areas), each headed by an SS- und Polizeiberichter directly

responsible to Pancke. The country's four largest cities-- Copenhagen, Odense, Aarhus, and Aalborg-- appear to have been selected as the central points for the four police administrative areas, In those four cities the German police force sought to concentrate their own direct control, assuming the functions of a regular police organization, including street patrolling.

Raids went on, both during and after the state of police emergency, throughout the country on a tremendous scale. The victims were dealt with by the Germans themselves, in many cases being summarily shot. There is no doubt that by this time SS and Police Courts were functioning alongside the military tribunals, far outdoing the latter in the severity of their mode of dispensing justice.

The SS and Police Leader, through his Press Office, issued to the population announcements having the effect of decrees. They established numerous security controls on the entire Danish population and while some of these disappeared with the lifting of the state of police emergency, the Office of the SS and Police Leader continued to make new regulations after the emergency, some of them almost as severe as the old.

On 5 November Dr. Best sought to reassure the Danish people as to German-Danish relations. In an interview with a North Schleswig German minority paper, republished throughout the Danish press, Best claimed that relations between Germany and Denmark had really undergone no change. He explained the recent measures as having been prompted entirely by the state of emergency caused by the war, which demanded the removal of all obstacles to the German war effort. He concluded by emphasizing that "the Danish and

the German peoples shall for all future remain neighbors and must therefore learn to live together." 1/

Thus there was a harking back to the conception of alliance administration. But while the head of the Legation (which had first espoused that concept) so spoke Pancke, head of the SS and Police, continued to act in a manner that belied the professions of Best. By the fall of 1944 the one-time "model protectorate" had dissappeared altogether from the sphere of realities. So far as the occupying power was concerned, the law-state had given way to the police-state.

1/ The interview appeared in the Copenhagen morning press for 6 November 1944.

APPENDIX I

DANISH MINISTERS1/ AND CHIEFS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS UNDER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

Department	Minister	Chief of Administrative Division
Prime Minister	Erik Scavenius	C. A. Møller
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Erik Scavenius	N. T. Svenningsen
Minister of Defense	Søren Brorsen	Major General J. D. V. Stemann (War)
		Vice Admiral A.H. Vedel (Marine)
Minister of the Interior	Jørgen Jørgensen	J.L. Saurbrey
Minister for Justice	E. Thune Jacobsen	A. Svendsen
Minister for Education	Dr. A.C. Højberg Christensen	C. Graae A. Barfod
Minister of Finance	K.H. Kofoed	E. Dige E. D. Cohn K. Korst
Minister for Labor	J. Kjaerbøl	J.K. Høirup
Minister for Commerce and Industry	Halfdan Hendriksen	H. Jespersen
Minister for Transportation	Niels M.A.Elgaard	F. Hoskiar
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries	Kristian Bording	J.W. Wilcke
Minister for Public Works	Gunnar Larsen	F. Hoskiar
Minister for Social Affairs	Lauritz Hansen	H. H. Koch
Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs	Valdemar Krach H Holbøll	J.T.H. Thomsen

1/ The entire body of Danish Ministers resigned on 29 August 1943.